Ordinary language users do in fact use RIGHT and WRONG in ways that permit of degrees, as pointed out in Chapter 1, but advocates of the binary theory may question the philosophical relevance of this. Meaning tracks use, but it is not certain that the current meanings (and uses) of RIGHT and WRONG are optimal. Gradualists need to show that the gradable notions of RIGHT and WRONG used by laypeople are better than their binary rivals and ought to be adopted by moral philosophers. The focus of this chapter is on what I call the argument from conflicting reasons. This argument seeks to show that gradable notions of RIGHT and WRONG enable moral theorists to articulate nuanced verdicts about moral conflicts, which cannot be expressed in binary theories. The gist of the argument is as follows: Some moral conflicts are irresolvable, and in those cases the deontic properties of acts favored and disfavored by conflicting reasons cannot be accurately captured by binary deontic verdicts.