Personal liberty can be understood in terms of rights. Liberty includes the right to make foolish choices, including some choices that are wrongful. The rights of persons, it is sometimes argued, can be restricted legitimately only for the sake of securing the equal liberty of others. Each person has an equal right to be free. If sound, such a view would establish very substantial limits on the permissibility of legal measures to improve or protect the ethical environment of a society. This chapter examines and rejects this equal right to be free view, challenging both its cogency and determinacy. It next considers a more moderate position that holds that persons have significant rights to do wrong, and that these rights place limits on the range of legal measures that can be taken to improve the ethical environment of a society. After clarifying the general idea of a right to do wrong, the chapter examines and defends two bases for such rights; the first appeals to the value of accommodation and the second to the nested character of rights. An adequate account of ethical environmentalism, the chapter concludes, must respect these rights and the limits on legal measures that they support.