Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- A note on the economics of institutions
- Empirical work in institutional economics: an overview
- 1 Toward an understanding of property rights
- Economic variables and the development of the law: the case of western mineral rights
- 2 Impediments to institutional change in the former Soviet system
- Why economic reforms fail in the Soviet system: a property rights–based approach
- 3 Transaction costs and economic development
- Public institutions and private transactions: a comparative analysis of the legal and regulatory environment for business transactions in Brazil and Chile
- 4 The evolution of modern institutions of growth
- Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England
- 5 Regulation in a dynamic setting
- The political economy of controls: American sugar
- 6 Price controls, property rights, and institutional change
- Roofs or stars: the stated intents and actual effects of a rents ordinance
- 7 Regulating natural resources: the evolution of perverse property rights
- Legally induced technical regress in the Washington salmon fishery
- 8 The politics of institutional change in a representative democracy
- A political theory of the origin of property rights: airport slots
- 9 The economics and politics of institutional change
- Paternalism in agricultural labor contracts in the U.S. South: implications for the growth of the welfare state
- Epilogue: economic performance through time
- Author index
- Subject index
- POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS
Roofs or stars: the stated intents and actual effects of a rents ordinance
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- A note on the economics of institutions
- Empirical work in institutional economics: an overview
- 1 Toward an understanding of property rights
- Economic variables and the development of the law: the case of western mineral rights
- 2 Impediments to institutional change in the former Soviet system
- Why economic reforms fail in the Soviet system: a property rights–based approach
- 3 Transaction costs and economic development
- Public institutions and private transactions: a comparative analysis of the legal and regulatory environment for business transactions in Brazil and Chile
- 4 The evolution of modern institutions of growth
- Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England
- 5 Regulation in a dynamic setting
- The political economy of controls: American sugar
- 6 Price controls, property rights, and institutional change
- Roofs or stars: the stated intents and actual effects of a rents ordinance
- 7 Regulating natural resources: the evolution of perverse property rights
- Legally induced technical regress in the Washington salmon fishery
- 8 The politics of institutional change in a representative democracy
- A political theory of the origin of property rights: airport slots
- 9 The economics and politics of institutional change
- Paternalism in agricultural labor contracts in the U.S. South: implications for the growth of the welfare state
- Epilogue: economic performance through time
- Author index
- Subject index
- POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS
Summary
History must be replete with instances where the stated intentions of legislative actions have diverged from the actual effects. However, for two reasons it is difficult to demonstrate such variance empirically in actual case studies. For one thing, legislators often tend to express their intentions in such vague terms as “to improve welfare.” How can one measure by any commonly accepted criteria how well the observable effects attributable to a given piece of legislation fulfill such an intention? Second, before observed effects can even be attributed to a given enactment, it is imperative that implications be derived which can be confirmed or falsified by facts; and this, in turn, demands sufficient information on the relevant constraints.
The rent control in Hong Kong enacted under the Rents Ordinance of 1921 presents an exceptionally useful case. The legislative intents could not have been stated more clearly: rent control was imposed to keep a roof over the heads of the sitting tenants and to encourage the construction of new buildings on vacant lands. And although most of the records were destroyed by the Japanese occupation of the colony during World War II, adequate information is still available to allow derivation of some crucial implications of the control.
THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE RENTS ORDINANCE
“The object of the Bill is to protect the tenants, not landlords,” declared the Hon. J. H. Kemp, Attorney-General of Hong Kong, on July 18, 1921, in the second reading of the Rents Ordinance Bill which passed the same day.
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- Empirical Studies in Institutional Change , pp. 224 - 243Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996
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