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5 - Bengal, 1757–67: Crossing the Threshold and Becoming a ‘Country’ Power

from Part II - Towards an All-India Grand Strategy, 1762–84

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2013

G. J. Bryant
Affiliation:
Ph.D. from King's College London
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Summary

it will require a Season when we can command rather than requesting.

Luke Scrafton (a close aide to Clive) on Mir Jafar's refusal to rent the Chittagong district to the Company, 23 December 1758.

no motives of Gratitude but Force alone must preserve Our Acquisitions.

Directors to Calcutta, 1 April 1760.

we are by no means desirous of making further Acquisitions engaging our Forces in very distant Projects [a reference to the proposed scheme to conduct the Emperor back to Delhi] unless the most absolute necessity should require it …

Directors to Calcutta, 9 March 1763.

We must become the nabobs in fact if not in name.

Clive to Thomas Rous (Chairman), 17 April 1765.

On handing Mir Jafar to the musnud on 1 July 1757 in the wake of Plassey, Clive, in a speech to the assembled Indian dignitaries, sought to allay their suspicions that the Company intended to become the power behind the throne by declaring: ‘that as long as [the Nawab's] affairs required it [the Company's army was] ready to keep the field, after which we should return to Calcutta and attend solely to commerce, which was our proper sphere and whole aim in these parts'. If Clive really believed this would be the likely course of events, he was being naive after his experience in the Carnatic, where Mohamed Ali had become psychologically and actually dependent on the Company to sustain him in power; and the aging Mir Jafar in his conduct at Plassey and immediately after had manifested a weakness of character that boded a similar development.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Emergence of British Power in India, 1600-1784
A Grand Strategic Interpretation
, pp. 153 - 185
Publisher: Boydell & Brewer
Print publication year: 2013

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