3.2.1 Direct Recognition of Marginalized Citizens

Over the course of his rise and rule, Chávez exerted all three of the above-described components of charisma, resulting in the formation of steadfast bonds with millions of Venezuelans. First, he directly recognized and politically incorporated masses of impoverished citizens who had suffered terribly during the 1980s and 1990s, during which Venezuela experienced a sustained economic decline and the PF regime disintegrated (Lupu Reference Lupu2014; Maingon Reference Maingon2004; Mainwaring Reference Mainwaring, Hicken and Kuhonta2014; Morgan Reference Morgan2011; Seawright Reference Seawright2012; Weyland Reference Weyland2003). Specifically, in the years leading up to his first presidential candidacy in 1998, Chávez recognized that Venezuelans’ widespread feelings of exclusion and suffering presented an important opportunity. Unlike politicians from across the ideological spectrum who came to support the PF regime’s widely unpopular neoliberal policies, Chávez publicly empathized with the people’s intense frustration and misery – as demonstrated through his attempted coup in 1992 (Roberts Reference Roberts2013, 1434–40). As a result, poor citizens came to see Chávez as the only leader capable of understanding and resolving their suffering. A Chavista activist illustrated this sentiment in an interview with the author. Unlike politicians from the PF regime who remained preoccupied with their “elite intellectualism … Chávez made the poor and invisible people visible.”Footnote ² Similarly, a prominent opposition politician stated that Chávez’s open recognition of people’s feelings of suffering and marginalization resonated deeply with them. The politician said, “Chávez understood the people’s accumulated frustration. The people didn’t feel valued [by other politicians]; Chávez made them feel recognized.”Footnote ³

Throughout his presidency, Chávez publicly acknowledged his followers’ suffering and reinforced his role as their savior. A speech he gave on January 10, 2003, illustrates how he claimed personal responsibility for poor and excluded groups:

By promising to single-handedly protect his people from hunger, disease, and death – maladies they suffered at the hand of his predecessors – Chávez illustrated how he sought to personally acknowledge and incorporate excluded sectors of the population into the center of political life. This recognition proved tremendously successful in laying the foundation for many poor citizens’ devotion to Chávez. Indeed, it consolidated their “powerful belief in the ability of the leader to provide transcendence and moral-political renewal” (Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson Reference Hawkins, Rosas, Johnson, Smilde and Hellinger2011, 187).

3.2.2 Approbation of Heroic Powers through Bold Reforms

To substantiate his claim to rescue the people from their misery, Chávez implemented a series of daring reforms that promised to sweep away the malevolent “political class” and bring peace and prosperity to the masses. He established what would become the cornerstone for all of these ambitious reforms – a new, hyperpresidential constitution that granted him hegemonic control over politics – immediately after assuming the presidency (Corrales and Penfold Reference Corrales and Penfold2015, 19–20; Ellner Reference Ellner2011, 435; Stoyan Reference Stoyan2020, 99–100). During his 1998 presidential campaign, Chávez vowed to enact this constitution to break away from the corrupt PF regime, personally restore and protect Venezuelans’ socioeconomic rights, and enhance their direct participation in politics. After his victory, in his February 1999 inaugural speech, the new president declared what would become a celebrated refrain among his followers: “I swear before God, before the Country, before my people that over this moribund Constitution, I will enact the democratic transformations necessary for the Republic to have a Magna Carta that fits with the new times. I swear” (Chávez Reference Chávez1999). On December 15, 1999, the referendum on the new constitution passed with 72 percent support.

The swiftness and thoroughness with which Chávez oversaw the construction of a new, far-reaching, and overwhelmingly popular constitution made him appear truly heroic in the eyes of his supporters. Several prior leaders, including Jaime Lusinchi (1984–89) and Rafael Caldera (1994–99), who had promised similar constitutional reforms, had failed to follow through (López Maya and Lander Reference López Maya, Lander, Smilde and Hellinger2011, 58). In contrast, Chávez made good on his vow by installing a new and transformative Magna Carta immediately after assuming office. This act – which, among other things, renamed Venezuela “The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela” – confirmed Chávez’s position in the eyes of his marginalized followers as their liberator and the symbolic reincarnation of national independence hero Simón Bolívar (López Maya and Lander Reference López Maya and Lander2000, 8–10).

The new constitution outlined a series of ambitious and unprecedented objectives, further demonstrating Chávez’s extraordinary capacities to provide the suffering followers with material prosperity and spiritual transcendence (Hawkins Reference Hawkins2010, 35; Stoyan Reference Stoyan2020, 105). For instance, in addition to representative democratic institutions, it created new participatory institutions, including electoral and civil branches to be overseen by the National Electoral Council and the Defender of the People, respectively. The constitution also moved beyond basic political and civil rights to proclaim economic and social inclusion for all citizens. To achieve this vision of inclusion and equality, Chávez endeavored not only to redistribute wealth, but also to fundamentally transform society – to “reestablish the human condition” (López Maya and Lander Reference López Maya, Lander, Smilde and Hellinger2011, 63). By ratifying his new constitution in the first year of his presidency, Chávez boldly signaled his intention to fundamentally transform Venezuela – a proposition that the poor masses embraced with fervor.

Inspired by the success of his new constitution, Chávez implemented several programs that achieved impressive initial results and thus further demonstrated his extraordinary capacities to his supporters. For example, starting in November 2001, he enacted an unprecedented program of land reform through the Law of Land and Agricultural Development and Decree 1.666. This program established a series of Rural and Urban Land Committees through which poor citizens could “exercise their right of property” and thus achieve socioeconomic inclusion, as envisioned by the new constitution (López Maya and Lander Reference López Maya, Lander, Smilde and Hellinger2011, 65). By 2005, 6,000 Urban Land Committees incorporating nearly one quarter of poor Venezuelans had been established (ibid., 66).

Despite the early success of the new constitution and the policies it inspired, however, several problems emerged that went unaddressed. Consequently, the striking initial impact of these reforms began to deteriorate just a few years after their implementation. For example, the new participatory institutions, purportedly designed to empower ordinary citizens, leaned heavily on Chávez’s personal leadership and thus served to concentrate his executive authority rather than provide the citizens with a direct and independent role in the political process (Ellner Reference Ellner2011, 431–32; López Maya and Lander Reference López Maya, Lander, Smilde and Hellinger2011, 60). Similarly, the land reform policies lacked regulation and enforcement mechanisms, resulting in violent conflict between landowners and peasants after the establishment of Rural Land Committees (ibid., 65–66). Additionally, Urban Land Committees, while initially successful in mobilizing the urban poor, became increasingly dependent on the Chávez regime for resources, resulting in a hierarchical structure that undermined the autonomy of local committee members (ibid., 67). Notably, in spite of these clear shortcomings, followers continued to view Chávez as their savior.

As these examples indicate, though Chávez’s constitution made sweeping promises to promote participatory democracy and social justice, the programs allegedly designed to achieve these objectives fell short and even contradicted values of political participation and social inclusion. Yet, rather than acknowledging these shortcomings, Chávez continually papered over them with new, equally bold and unrealistic measures, which he delivered through spontaneous executive decrees and “organic laws” rushed through the National Assembly (López Maya Reference López Maya2016, 211). The audacity and seemingly direct delivery of these gestures only reinforced Chávez’s valiant image in the eyes of his supporters. As a policy coordinator from the Central Bank of Venezuela described, “Chávez was a magician who created the illusion of progress.”Footnote ⁴ While unrealistic and irresponsible, the initial, tangible effects of his daring policies – embodied by his ambitious new constitution – “proved” his extraordinariness in the eyes of the followers, thereby making him worthy of their devotion.

3.2.3 Construction of a Symbolic Narrative

To solidify his charismatic bonds with the people and consolidate the transformative power of his movement, Chávez cultivated a vivid narrative with three key characteristics. First, the narrative employed “missionary” rhetoric that glorified his image and tied him to classic heroes embedded in Venezuelan culture, including Simón Bolívar, Venezuela’s nineteenth-century liberator; Ezequiel Zamora, the hero of Venezuela’s Federal War; Guicaipuro, an indigenous Venezuelan chief who fought against the Spanish Conquest; and even Jesus Christ (Martínez Meucci and de Lustgarten Reference Martínez Meucci and de Lustgarten2014, 19–21; Michelutti Reference Michelutti2017, 237–38; Zúquete Reference Zúquete2008, 97). The comparison with familiar, beloved heroes cast a saintly glow on Chávez’s figure and imbued his mission with profound historical importance. In fact, the very labeling of his movement as “Bolivarian” suggested to his followers that Chávez did not merely seek to improve their lives, but that he also sought to “reclaim the dignity of the people, of the country, and of the supposedly better past, the mystical, glorious and heroic path that Venezuela always associated with the figure of Bolívar” (Martínez Meucci and de Lustgarten Reference Martínez Meucci and de Lustgarten2014, 23). By depicting Chávez as the true son of Venezuela’s most celebrated and tragic hero, his narrative tapped into several preexisting identities relevant to his followers, ranging from popular Christianity to mestizaje to Santería, and caused Chávez’s followers to worship him like a deity (Michelutti Reference Michelutti2017, 234–36). As a professor of social and cultural studies at the Bolivarian University of Venezuela passionately proclaimed two years after the leader’s death, “Chávez is on the altar with the saints!”Footnote ⁵

Second, while cultivating his image as a hero of epic proportions, Chávez’s narrative also demonized his opponents. In contrast with his followers, whom he affectionately called “patriots” and “soldiers,” Chávez referred to his adversaries as “enemies,” “coup plotters,” “imperialists,” and agents of the “extreme right” (Gauna Reference Gauna2018, 47). For example, in 2003 he declared in a speech, “this is not about the pro-Chávez against the anti-Chávez … but … the patriots against the enemies of the homeland” (Zúquete Reference Zúquete2008, 105). Further, when opposition citizens protested, he often framed them as enemies of the true “people” and responded with brutal punishment rather than openness to negotiation, as illustrated by his response to the December 2002 strike by workers from the national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA) (Corrales and Penfold Reference Corrales and Penfold2015, 24–25).Footnote ⁶ He also routinely marginalized and persecuted opposition judges, leaders, and parties and expelled advisors from within his own ranks whom he accused of betraying him, periodically humiliating these individuals through surprise attacks broadcasted to the public on his weekly television show (Carroll Reference Carroll2013, 64).

The establishment of an all-out war against a “clear-cut enemy” helped promote cohesion and obedience among Chávez’s followers by convincing them that their beloved leader’s critics posed a grave, even existential, threat (Huddy Reference Huddy2001, 150). As explained by the Bolivarian University professor, “Under threats from the ‘extreme right,’ Chávez would unify the people, so there was not dispersion.” In addition to strengthening cohesion among his followers, this strategy made Chávez appear even more charismatic and provided him with convenient scapegoats to blame for drops in performance. By alienating his movement’s opponents and attacking “traitors” from within it, the narrative also helped solidify a deep-seated and profoundly personalistic cleavage.

Third, Chávez’s symbolic narrative generated a mission that promised not only to vanquish evil opponents but also to emancipate the followers from their suffering by bringing about a holistic transformation of society. In contrast to “small, pragmatic changes to an already existing political system,” the mission envisioned a “rebirth” of Venezuela (Zúquete Reference Zúquete2008, 112). The urgency of this all-encompassing agenda left no time or space for questions from hesitant observers. Rather, Chávez emphasized that successful transformation demanded the absolute faith of his followers; those who failed to demonstrate this commitment would suffer dire consequences. As Zúquete states, “To stress this need for a radical transformation of the country, Chávez’s discourse gain[ed] an apocalyptic dimension in which the survival of the country and even the world seem[ed] to be in question” (ibid.). A Chavista activist and journalist further stressed, “the transformation cannot happen without the followers; we need their faith in Chávez.”Footnote ⁷

To build his symbolic narrative, Chávez established constant, direct communication with his followers through speeches and other performances that dominated media outlets. As the journalist explained, Chávez was a “communicational genius who started a revolution through the media.” The star of his own weekly television show, “Aló Presidente,” he spoke directly into the camera for hours, giving his followers the impression of having an intimate conversation with their president (Capriles Reference Capriles2012, 60; Carroll Reference Carroll2013, 15–18; Zúquete Reference Zúquete2008, 100). He also frequently interrupted radio and television programs to make “emergency” announcements (cadenas) and reinforce the perception of his omnipresence in Venezuelans’ lives (Carroll Reference Carroll2013, 24). As a palace historian and archivist for Chávez described, the founder also traveled tirelessly around the country to personally connect with his followers, both during and between electoral campaigns.Footnote ⁸

In addition to ensuring frequent and direct communication with his followers, Chávez strengthened his narrative by tightening his control over the media and saturating public spaces with symbols that glorified him and his movement. For example, Chávez’s government purchased or intimidated opposing news outlets by cutting funding, revoking licenses, and constricting the availability of material supplies (Weyland Reference Weyland2013, 19, 23–24). This left the movement with unencumbered space to project the narrative through media platforms ranging from television to radio to print. Chávez also took literal and symbolic ownership of traditional Venezuelan literature, art, and music. His regime sponsored literature, film, art, and music festivals and enjoyed the support of authors, musicians, and artists who fervently dedicated their work to the Comandante. Lastly, the movement filled physical spaces with Bolivarian symbols in the form of posters, murals, statues, buildings, colors, and songs that glorified the founder and his heroic predecessors. For example, Figure 3.1 displays a mural depicting Chávez with Bolívar and Christ (Ramirez Reference Ramirez2014). When combined with his recognition of previously excluded citizens and his implementation of bold reforms, the omnipresence of Chávez’s narrative transformed Chavismo into “a charismatic form of political religion” to which his followers became deeply attached (Zúquete Reference Zúquete2008, 92).

Figure 3.1. Mural of Chávez, Christ, and Bolívar

In sum, Chávez formed steadfast charismatic bonds with his followers by fulfilling three conditions. First, he directly recognized the suffering of marginalized citizens and promised to rescue them from their misery. Second, he proved his ability to follow through on this promise by implementing bold reforms that made an impressive initial impact on followers’ lives, such as a radical new constitution. Third, he established a compelling narrative that tied his heroic leadership to Venezuelan history, underscored the dangerous threat posed by his opponents, and reinforced his mission to provide transcendence by bringing about a profound transformation of society.

3.3.1 Programmatic Attachments

The programmatic mechanism suggests that citizens’ attachments rest on the substantive coherence of the leader’s policies. Grounded in long-standing studies of issue preferences, retrospective and prospective economic voting, and partisanship, most scholars assume that this mechanism forms the natural and proper core of party and electoral politics (e.g., Achen Reference Achen2002; Downs Reference Downs1957; Fiorina Reference Fiorina1981; Key Reference Key1966; Roberts Reference Roberts2014). To develop programmatic ties, citizens must have well-formed issue preferences that align with the leader’s policies (Key Reference Key1966, 7–8). In addition, the leader must consistently and successfully carry out these policies to earn voters’ approval and establish a clear programmatic trademark that is distinct from that of other parties (Fiorina Reference Fiorina1981, 66). In contrast to bold, shortsighted reforms, whose initially impressive performance casts the individual leader in a heroic light, the programmatic trademark rests on the substantive content and steady functioning of social and economic policies. Citizens “periodically update” their attachment to the movement based on the leader’s adherence to this trademark (Kitschelt Reference Kitschelt2000, 846). If the leader fails to implement distinctive and effective policies that are consistent with this trademark, citizens punish him and reduce their attachment to the movement (Achen Reference Achen2002, 151; Lupu Reference Lupu2013, 52).

Several scholars claim that Chávez developed a programmatic trademark that emphasized state-centered economics and redistributive social programs called missions. To begin, Chávez attempted to increase the state’s role in the economy. For instance, he tightened government control over the state-run oil company, PdVSA, by ratifying the New Organic Hydrocarbon Law in 2001 (Parker Reference Parker2005, 44). Shortly thereafter, he nationalized dozens of non-oil companies and implemented a sweeping Land Reform Law. He also eventually imposed strict currency exchange and price controls to counteract inflation and keep consumer goods affordable (Corrales and Penfold Reference Corrales and Penfold2015, 64).

However, Chávez did not stake out a clear position on economic policy until late 2001, well after he had consolidated widespread popular support. Upon taking office, he confirmed his center-right predecessor’s minister of finance, Maritza Izaguirre, and appeased the International Monetary Fund by cutting the state’s budget by 7 percent and strengthening the Investment Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilization (Corrales and Penfold Reference Corrales and Penfold2015, 48–55). Despite these economically liberal policies, which contrasted sharply with his later turn to “socialism of the 21^st century,” Chávez’s movement cultivated impressive popular support: In 1999 and 2000, between 38 and 41 percent of Venezuelans claimed to identify with the movement and 75 to 84 percent approved of Chávez’s performance (Consultores 21 2014).

By late 2001, Chávez began to advertise and implement state-centered policies that were inspired by his new constitution. While many of these programs achieved impressive results at the outset, their performance soon dropped, providing little foundation for sustained programmatic support. For example, though booming oil prices from late 2003 to 2008 facilitated substantial economic growth, Chávez’s protectionist policies failed to stimulate investment and instead invited rampant corruption (Ellner Reference Ellner2010, 88–91; Corrales and Penfold Reference Corrales and Penfold2015, 70). Thus, production in non-oil sectors declined, leading to sharp rises in the number of imported goods; investment in infrastructure lagged, generating electricity and water shortages; and price and exchange controls caused increasing inflation, a rising black market exchange rate, consumer goods shortages, and capital flight. The economy contracted by 3.3 percent of GDP when oil prices fell in 2009, and in 2010, Chávez was forced to sharply devalue the local currency (Corrales and Penfold Reference Corrales and Penfold2015, 63–70). The ultimate failure of these policies and the resulting inflation and shortages disproportionately affected low-income citizens, many of whom were strong supporters of Chavismo.

Nevertheless, the substantial decline in Chávez’s economic performance did not temper his followers’ praise. Instead, his policy failures provided an opportunity for the charismatic leader to strengthen his symbolic narrative by blaming opposition actors whom he labeled as enemies of his revolution, including “imperial powers” like the United States and local agents of the “extreme right” (Zúquete Reference Zúquete2008, 104–7). For instance, as Chávez’s economic performance declined over the course of his rule, his anti-US rhetoric steadily increased – even as the US tempered its critiques of Venezuela (Corrales and Penfold Reference Corrales and Penfold2015, 113). Similarly, on the domestic front, Chávez accused his opponents of plotting “conspiracies against and betrayals of the homeland,” thereby undermining the success of his policies (Gauna Reference Gauna2018, 54–55). The success of this rhetorical strategy demonstrates citizens’ willingness to shield their beloved leader from criticism and suggests that their loyalty to his movement was not rooted in the substantive content and consistent performance of his economic programs.

In addition to state-centered economics, Chávez implemented dozens of redistributive social “missions.” Beginning with their launch in 2003, Chávez poured billions of petro-dollars into these programs in areas ranging from health care to information technology (Maingon Reference Maingon2016, 20). The most prominent missions sought to reduce poverty and inequality through better provision of food, health care, education, and housing. Through these programs, Chávez appeared to prioritize the objectives of equality and social justice showcased in his new constitution.

Yet, like his economic policies, Chávez’s social missions suffered from serious problems. The missions sprang up via presidential decree in a rapid, improvisational, and politicized manner that undercut their sustainability. Consequently, while they improved poor Venezuelans’ quality of life at the outset, the missions failed to perform favorably after their first few years of operation (Corrales and Penfold Reference Corrales and Penfold2015, 61; España Reference España2014). In fact, by 2007, Chávez’s most popular social program – the healthcare mission Barrio Adentro – was considered deeply flawed and largely inoperational (Aponte Reference Aponte2014, 128, 165). While poverty declined from 2003 to 2006, it stagnated from 2007 to 2012 and began to reverse thereafter (Ellner Reference Ellner2011, 433–38; Aponte Reference Aponte2014, 153; Maingon Reference Maingon2016, 119–20). By 2014, poverty had risen to 48.4 percent, surpassing 1998 levels by over 3 percentage points (España Reference España2014, 4). Finally, despite the missions’ rapid initial growth, a 2014 survey indicates that a mere 10 percent of citizens report having benefited from them, suggesting a failure to sustainably reduce poverty and protect Venezuelans’ socioeconomic rights (Aponte Reference Aponte2014, 168; España Reference España2014, 8). Thus, it is more likely that followers’ fervent approval of Chávez’s programs throughout this period arose from “lingering beliefs in [his] charisma” than from the substantive integrity of his policies (Merolla and Zechmeister Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2011, 29).

In short, the superficial nature and volatile performance of Chávez’s economic and social policies indicates his preference for dramatic reform over programmatic development. Though he promised to establish economic and social inclusion in Venezuela, the delayed implementation of his policies and, ultimately, their negative performance made for a weak programmatic trademark. Most importantly, the bold, hasty application and short-lived success of these policies prioritized the establishment of Chávez’s savior-like image at the expense of medium- and long-term effectiveness. Consequently, while deepening followers’ affective ties to Chávez, these policies held little appeal for programmatically principled voters. Moreover, the delayed application of Chávez’s policies cannot account for the movement’s widespread support during his first three years in office. These factors demonstrate how personalism infused Chávez’s policy agenda and compromised the development of programmatic linkages.

3.3.2 Organizational Attachments

The organizational mechanism suggests that political attachments rest on the ties people cultivate with each other through local involvement in movement-affiliated activities and groups. Through these ties, citizens foster an enduring group identity that is maintained via involvement in the movement’s social clubs, neighborhood associations, and political organizations (Granovetter Reference Granovetter1973; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler Reference Green, Palmquist and Schickler2002). Building this type of bond requires the followers’ widespread and regular participation. The movement’s organizations must also be sustained and strengthened over time and must maintain a “horizontal” rather than hierarchical character to inspire group members’ feelings of efficacy (Ellner Reference Ellner2011, 430–31; Rhodes-Purdy Reference Rhodes-Purdy2015, 423–24). Unlike charismatic attachments, in which followers’ sense of belonging comes directly from the leader, the organizational mechanism suggests that the followers ease their feelings of exclusion in a bottom-up fashion by interacting with each other.

Chávez promoted the organizational dynamic of his movement and even enshrined citizen participation in the 1999 constitution as a necessary condition for democracy (García-Guadilla Reference García-Guadilla and Villasante2012, 220). Early in his presidency, he launched several community-based organizations aimed at placing governance into the hands of the people, including Urban Land Committees, Health Committees, Technical Roundtables for Water, and Bolivarian Circles (Aponte Reference Aponte2014; López Maya and Lander Reference López Maya, Lander, Smilde and Hellinger2011). In 2006, he appeared to strengthen this initiative by establishing the Communal Councils (CCs). Officially registered, neighborhood-level groups consisting of 200 to 400 families, the CCs were intended to be self-governing: They would elect representatives, run their own meetings, and solicit funds directly from the government to resolve problems (Aponte Reference Aponte2014, 264).

In practice, however, this network failed to cultivate genuine organizational ties to the movement. First, citizen participation in the CCs was neither widespread nor regular. A 2005–2007 survey of poor Venezuelans by Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (UCAB) suggests that only 29 percent had ever participated in a community event, while only 7 percent had participated in a CC (Aponte Reference Aponte2014, 260). Among the few citizens who participated in CCs, a 2008 survey by Centro Gumilla indicates that less than 50 percent regularly attended meetings (Machado Reference Machado2009, 48–49). Second, the poor infrastructure of these groups compromised followers’ ability to develop a strong grassroots network. Chávez’s sluggish and haphazard institutionalization of the CCs reflects this weakness: He did not legally recognize them through the Law of Communal Councils until 2006, and he neglected to establish a government ministry to oversee them until 2010 (Aponte Reference Aponte2014, 264). By 2012, in a famous speech titled “Changing Course” (Golpe de Timón), Chávez angrily acknowledged the weakness of his movement’s grassroots spirit (Chávez Reference Chávez, Bonnefoy and Avila2012). Third, much evidence indicates that the CCs functioned in a hierarchical fashion. In many CCs, a mere handful of members remained active, and leaders often served as party bosses rather than local representatives, usurping control over projects and funds at the expense of other residents (García-Guadilla Reference García-Guadilla and Villasante2012, 227–35). Perhaps as a result, a 2009 survey by Centro Gumilla suggests 76 percent of Venezuelans perceived CCs as corrupt, while 77 percent agreed that CCs did not involve most members of their community (Machado Reference Machado2009, 37; Aponte Reference Aponte2014, 271).

Ultimately, the evidence suggests that the CCs did not foster genuine grassroots empowerment. While Chávez extolled the virtues of participatory democracy and made dramatic (if irregular) efforts to establish community organizations, these groups suffered from low participation rates and severe institutional weaknesses. Outspoken leaders dominated many CCs and bred distrust rather than a genuine participatory spirit. Moreover, citizens’ feelings of recognition and inclusion depended more on their devotion to Chávez than their involvement in community affairs. Indeed, while followers praised Chávez for giving them a voice in politics, they did not exercise that voice in practice through involvement in the movement’s participatory organizations. Instead, Chávez imposed cohesion over his movement in a top-down fashion, preventing “formal collective decision-making” and suppressing “the emergence of a second-in-command” (Ellner Reference Ellner2011, 434). Therefore, it is unlikely that swaths of followers developed strong attachments to Chavismo based on an organizational mechanism.

3.4.1 The Dependent Variable

I construct the dependent variable – attachment to Chavismo – using a question on respondents’ party identification. Political scientists have long understood party identification as a genuine expression of membership in or attachment to a political group (Campbell et al. Reference Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes1960; Green et al. Reference Green, Palmquist and Schickler2002; Lupu Reference Lupu2013). Venezuelans’ identification with Chavista-affiliated parties, therefore, captures their self-perceived political ties more adequately than vote choice, which can result from a range of factors extending beyond attachment to the movement. I create a dichotomous measure of attachment where citizens who identify with one of three party labels connected to Chávez’s movement – Movement of the Fifth Republic (MVR), Fatherland for All (PPT), or the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) – are considered “attached” while citizens who do not are considered “not attached.”Footnote ⁹ Twenty-three percent of all respondents express attachment to these parties, while just fewer than 9 percent identify with non-Chavista parties. Due to the weakly institutionalized nature of Chavismo, measuring identification with associated parties likely underestimates the number of Venezuelans attached to the broader movement. Nevertheless, I use this measure because the survey does not ask about attachment to the movement per se – and I assume that citizens who identify with affiliated parties also have genuine attachments to the movement.Footnote ¹⁰

3.4.2 The Independent Variables

I select several survey items as independent variables to represent the three attachment mechanisms. For the charismatic mechanism, I incorporate a five-question battery on perceptions of Chávez’s charisma developed by Merolla and Zechmeister (Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2011).Footnote ¹¹ This focus on citizens’ perceptions of the leader, rather than “objective” personality traits, captures the subjective dynamic of charismatic authority (Weber Reference Weber, Roth and Wittich1922/1978, 242). As shown previously in this chapter, the factors underlying the charismatic mechanism – direct recognition, bold reforms, and the symbolic narrative – also serve to increase perceptions of the leader’s charisma, suggesting the validity of the measure. Though many successful leaders are perceived as charismatic, scholars have stressed that, relative to other Latin American presidents, perceptions of Chávez’s charisma were uniquely high throughout his tenure (Weyland Reference Weyland2003, 822; Zúquete Reference Zúquete2008, 91; Hawkins Reference Hawkins2010, 37–38; Merolla and Zechmeister Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2011, 37–38). Furthermore, while related to party attachment, leader approval, and vote choice, charismatic perceptions remain a theoretically and empirically distinct concept.Footnote ¹²

The questions in the LAPOP charisma battery ask respondents to report on a four-point scale the extent to which they agree about five statements: (1) Chávez articulates a compelling vision of the future, (2) Chávez instills pride in being associated with him, (3) Chávez’s actions build my respect for him, (4) Chávez considers the moral and ethical consequences of his decisions, and (5) Chávez goes beyond his own self-interest for the good of the group (Merolla and Zechmeister Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2011, 37). I add and rescale these items to create a continuous score of Chávez’s charisma ranging from zero (not at all charismatic) to one (very charismatic).Footnote ¹³

For the programmatic mechanism, I first include survey items that gauge respondents’ perceptions of Chávez’s economic performance. Following Merolla and Zechmeister (Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2011), I combine four questions – on current and retrospective evaluations of the economy at the national and personal levels – into a single variable using factor analysis, then rescale the variable to range from zero (bad) to one (good). It is important to note that this indicator does not exclusively reflect the programmatic mechanism. Indeed, citizens could give positive evaluations because they approve of the regime’s economic programs or because they perceive Chávez as a savior who makes good on his promise to rescue the people. As Merolla and Zechmeister suggest, “individuals who perceive Chávez as highly charismatic see Venezuela’s economy … through rose-colored glasses” (Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2011, 31). In other words, charismatic perceptions of Chávez may cause respondents to evaluate the economy more favorably. To examine this possibility, I run one set of models in which economic evaluations and charismatic perceptions are independent and a second set of models in which they are interacted. The interaction term will shed light on whether and how charismatic perceptions impact the effect of economic evaluations on citizens’ attachments to Chavismo.

In addition to economic performance, I incorporate two questions on respondents’ assessments of Chávez’s two largest social missions to measure the strength of the programmatic mechanism – the health mission (Barrio Adentro) and the food mission (Mercal). I add these evaluations and rescale the sum to range from zero (bad) to one (good). Incorporating these variables cuts the sample size by over half (N = 641) because only about 50 and 70 percent of respondents report having used the health and food missions, respectively. To address this issue, one set of models examines whether respondents accessed these missions in the first place, while a second set explores the subsample of respondents who report having used both missions. Whereas the former variable measures access to the missions, which tends to be restricted based on partisanship (Hawkins et al. Reference Hawkins, Rosas, Johnson, Smilde and Hellinger2011), the latter more closely reflects citizens’ substantive evaluation of those programs.

To measure the influence of participation in movement-affiliated organizations on attachment to Chavismo, I incorporate a question about respondents’ involvement in the CCs. Because the CCs represent the movement’s central network of participatory organizations, respondents with organizational ties should report extensive involvement in these groups. I rescale a four-point scale in which one is “never” and four is “every week” to range from zero (low) to one (high).

Finally, I incorporate four control variables thought to influence citizens’ identification with Chavismo: socioeconomic status, education, age, and gender.Footnote ¹⁴ Table 3.1 displays descriptive statistics for the key dependent and independent variables for both surveys. Additional information on the survey can be found in the online Appendix A.

In total, I analyze four binary logistic regression models. Models A and C include the variable on access to the missions and thus include most respondents (N = 1326). Models B and D replace this variable with one on substantive evaluation of the missions among those who accessed them (N = 579). Finally, Models A and B treat charismatic perceptions and economic evaluations independently, whereas Models C and D interact with the two variables. The next section discusses the results based on these four models.

3.4.3 Results

The results (Table 3.2) suggest the uniquely strong influence of charisma on citizens’ attachments to Chavismo. Models A and B indicate that charismatic perceptions have a statistically significant and substantively large impact on citizens’ ties to the movement. In the unrestricted sample (Model A), respondents who perceive Chávez as extremely charismatic (score of one) are 47 percentage points more likely to express attachment than those who find Chávez extremely uncharismatic (score of zero), holding the remaining independent variables constant at their means. Among mission users (Model B), this figure rises to 58 percentage points (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2. Predicted probability of attachment at different levels of charismatic perceptions

In contrast, the programmatic and organizational variables are only weakly associated with attachments to the movement. Models A and B suggest that economic performance does not have a significant, independent impact on Bolivarian attachment. Models C and D examine the potential interactive effect of charismatic perceptions and economic evaluations on attachment. Interpreting this effect requires visual examination of predicted probabilities (Figure 3.3), as the statistical significance of interactions in nonlinear regression does not necessarily indicate a substantively meaningful effect (Brambor, Clark, and Golder Reference Brambor, Clark and Golder2006, 73–74). Model C suggests that there is no meaningful interactive effect: At different levels of charismatic perceptions, the influence of economic performance evaluations on attachment does not change significantly. However, Model D suggests that the interactive effect may have a small, negative effect among mission users: As charismatic perceptions of Chávez increase, the effect of performance evaluations on Bolivarian attachment decreases slightly. While this interaction appears significant, its negative sign suggests that higher charismatic perceptions dampen the influence of performance evaluations. The evidence therefore underscores the “Teflon” effect of Chávez’s charisma (Merolla and Zechmeister Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2011, 30), which protects him from the negative consequences of poor performance.

Figure 3.3. Effect of economic evaluations on probability of attachment at different levels of charismatic perceptions: Interactive models

In terms of social programs, accessing benefits from one or both missions significantly increases the probability of expressing attachment to the movement. However, as discussed earlier, this does not necessarily suggest that the programmatic mechanism is at work. In fact, among mission users (Model B), substantive assessments of the missions have no significant effect, suggesting that the quality of these programs does not influence respondents’ attachments. Finally, across all four models, participation in the CCs has no significant association with attachment. These data indicate the relative weakness of the programmatic and grassroots mechanisms while further highlighting the strong effects of personalism on loyalty to the movement. Taken together, the four models suggest the relative insignificance of programmatic and organizational factors on Bolivarian attachments while highlighting the disproportionate influence of charismatic perceptions of Chávez.

To ensure the validity of the results, I explore two alternative explanations for the underwhelming effects of programmatic and organizational factors. First, in the additive models (A and B), multicollinearity between charismatic perceptions and the other independent variables could artificially inflate the significance of the former and depress that of the latter. However, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for charisma for both models is low (1.66 and 1.48, respectively), suggesting that multicollinearity does not account for the results.Footnote ¹⁵ Second, preference falsification may explain the insignificance of these variables. Specifically, respondents could feel pressured to evaluate Chávez’s charisma more highly than they otherwise might. Yet, citizens generally do not hesitate to express dissatisfaction with Chávez’s regime. In fact, 17 percent of respondents perceive Chávez as completely uncharismatic and 56 percent rate his performance as mediocre, poor, or very poor. One would expect substantially higher approval ratings if preference falsification were at play. The remaining explanation suggests that citizens’ intense perceptions of Chávez’s charisma are intimately linked with their attachment to his movement, while programmatic and organizational factors have notably weaker effects.

4.1.1 The Symbolic Narrative and the Establishment of a Resilient Political Identity

I claim that the followers’ charismatic attachments help perpetuate the movement by cultivating an enduring political identity. This identity is important because, as suggested by political psychologists, it influences citizens’ attitudes, behaviors, and sense of purpose in several ways. For one, it provides citizens with a “lens to interpret their world” (Cramer Reference Cramer2016, 6, 20). This “worldview” shapes identifiers’ understanding of their surroundings, including the mundane activities of daily life, major events, and the motives and behaviors of other people. Second, the identity causes the followers, who are members of the “in-group,” to distinguish themselves from non-identifiers, the “out-group.” This division is important because in-group members often struggle to sympathize with and can even alienate their out-group counterparts, who maintain a fundamentally different worldview (Tajfel Reference Tajfel1974). Likewise, members of the out-group develop an “anti-identity” and corresponding feelings of aversion toward the followers, thereby increasing the affective polarization of society and strengthening the personalistic cleavage (Cyr and Meléndez Reference Cyr and Meléndez2015; Iyengar et al. Reference Abramowitz and McCoy2019; Meléndez Reference Meléndez2019). Third, while generating antipathy between in- and out-groups, the identity increases cohesion among fellow in-group members by providing them with a shared sense of meaning in their lives and faith in a common purpose (Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013, 18; Zúquete Reference Zúquete2013, 266–67). In short, citizens’ identity can influence politics by shaping their worldview, antagonizing outsiders, and infusing the followers with a shared sense of purpose.

The charismatic founder’s symbolic narrative plays a crucial role in the construction of the followers’ identification with the movement because it reinforces each of the abovementioned elements. First, the narrative’s glorification of the founder forms the basis of the followers’ worldview. More than merely viewing the founder as an inspirational leader, the narrative endows him with “quasi-divine status,” such that the followers feel his symbolic presence in their daily lives (Zúquete Reference Zúquete2008, 107). Even after the founder has died or disappeared, the followers continue to praise him in a Christ-like fashion and even search for manifestations of the founder’s spirit in their world. This ongoing hero worship impacts the followers’ understanding of politics. In particular, it sustains their collective faith in the leader’s mission to provide the followers with salvation. Moreover, the followers come to believe that the mission cannot succeed without a heroic leader at the helm. This, in turn, shapes their expectations of future politicians: Who, they ask, will embody the spirit of the founder and revive his quest to rescue the people?

In addition to anchoring the followers’ understanding of the world in the immortal and heroic vision of the founder, the narrative’s portrayal of opponents as threats to the people’s well-being strengthens the followers’ identity. The perception that followers are constantly under attack generates feelings of fear and anxiety, which bolsters “in-group unity” while “inflaming out-group hostilities” (Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013, 44). Additionally, the narrative causes supporters to feel resentful toward those who oppose the movement. This makes reconciliation between the two groups more difficult after the founder has gone, and it incentivizes subsequent leaders to deepen, rather than soften, the divide between the followers for political gain (Cramer Reference Cramer2016, 14–15).

Third, the narrative helps turn charismatic attachments into a resilient identity by upholding the founder’s mission of societal transformation and spiritual transcendence. Whereas the attacks on opponents distinguish the followers from their “enemies,” this mission provides the followers with a positive reason for belonging to the group: the promise of societal transformation and, ultimately, salvation (Zúquete Reference Zúquete2013, 267). Even after the death of the founder, their continued faith in his mission strengthens feelings of warmth, pride, and closeness with one another, as it reaffirms their sense of purpose and provides “a sense of symbolic common fate” (Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013, 24).

Together, the three abovementioned elements contribute to the persistence of the followers’ attachments and corresponding identity by strengthening the “simultaneously individual and social” nature of the identity (Huddy Reference Huddy2001, 146). At the individual level, the followers perceive themselves as having unmediated, personal connections to the founder. This perception holds tremendous emotional significance for the followers and impacts their attitudes and behaviors. At the group level, the followers’ shared belief in and commitment to the founder’s mission to transform society makes them part of a “moral community,” which transcends the individual level by providing the followers with the powerful feeling that they belong to the group (Zúquete Reference Zúquete2013, 263–34). This collective dimension of the followers’ identity gives them a common purpose and holds the movement together over time, lending it coherence despite ideological heterogeneity, programmatic volatility, and factionalism.

In sum, the charismatic founder’s symbolic narrative plays a crucial role in constructing a stable, deeply personalistic identity among the followers that has strong individual and collective dimensions. First, the narrative’s sanctification of the founder perpetuates his symbolic influence in the followers’ lives and establishes an enduring worldview. Second, the portrayal of opponents as enemies strengthens the identity by deepening the cleavage between the founder’s disciples and opponents, generating affective polarization, and promoting cohesion among the followers. Third, faith in the founder’s mission of holistic transformation provides the followers with positive affirmation and a deep sense of purpose that transcends the self. The combination of these aspects of the symbolic narrative turns citizens’ attachments to the leader into a profound, quasi-spiritual identity that cannot be easily transformed when the founder disappears.

4.1.2 The Perpetuation of the Charismatic Identity after the Death of the Founder

As described earlier, the cultivation of a charismatic identity helps solidify citizens’ attachments to the founder during his lifetime. Even so, his death generates a crisis because he can no longer personally sustain his deep, emotional bonds with the followers. To recover from this situation, the routinization thesis indicates that, similar to more conventional parties, the movement must develop an organizational network through which to reach supporters and maintain their loyalty (Madsen and Snow Reference Madsen and Snow1991). Samuels and Zucco’s important study of the Workers’ Party in Brazil illustrates this mechanism of creating and sustaining attachments. As the authors state, the party mobilizes “pre-existing organizational networks” and sets up local offices to “cultivate extensive and lasting affective partisan attachments” (Samuels and Zucco Reference Samuels and Zucco2015, 755).

In contrast, I argue that, in charismatic movements, it is the followers’ personal preservation of their identity, rather than the mobilization of an organizational network, that sustains the movement in the wake of the founder’s death. The followers, who are distraught due to their founder’s departure, cling to his symbolic narrative to preserve their sense of identity and reassure themselves of his ongoing spiritual presence. This sentiment carries the movement forward until a new leader rises and assumes the founder’s mantle.

During such leaderless periods, I claim that the followers engage in two activities to sustain the founder’s narrative and, by extension, their affective identification with the movement. First, the followers preserve and recount cherished memories of their personal experiences, or their loved ones’ personal experiences, during the founder’s rule. These stories describe the followers’ interactions with the founder and depict how he single-handedly improved the lives of the followers and their loved ones. The focus of these stories on the relationship between individual followers and the founder, as well as on the leader’s heroic gestures, reflect and sustain the unmediated emotional nature of the followers’ relationship to the movement. Moreover, as parents and grandparents regale their children with these stories, younger generations of the followers develop their own affective ties to the movement, even without personally experiencing the founder’s rule. The retelling of these stories, thus, establishes a pattern of “continuous ritualization and symbolism” that helps preserve the identity over time (Zúquete Reference Zúquete2013, 267).

In addition to these stories, the followers save physical objects and other symbols that memorialize the founder and his mission of transcendence. For example, some keep items such as clothing, flags, and “gifts” from the founder ranging from marbles to books to sewing machines. They also bequeath these sacred objects to their children, helping perpetuate the identity over time. Other supporters change their physical appearance, donning tattoos of the founder’s face or changing their hairstyle to mimic the founder’s (e.g., Auyero Reference Auyero2001, 120). These symbols maintain the followers’ sentimental connections to the movement because, as suggested by political psychologists, they evoke overwhelming, positive emotions among members of the group (Citrin and Sears Reference Citrin and Sears2009, 162; Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013, 19; Sears Reference Sears and Kuklinski2001, 14). The symbols also provide physical markers that differentiate members of the group from outsiders, reinforcing the cleavage between the followers and their opponents (Sears Reference Sears and Kuklinski2001, 15). Finally, similar to the crucifix in Christianity, the symbols remind the followers of the reason they belong to the movement: namely, their belief in the founder’s mission of salvation (ibid., 16).

4.1.3 Charismatic Movements “In Abeyance”

To recapitulate, the symbolic narrative is crucial for the survival of citizens’ charismatic attachments to the movement after the death of the founder. The followers sustain the narrative through individual-level stories and symbols, which reinforce their attachments and solidify their personalistic identification with the movement. Importantly, the personalistic nature of the followers’ identity becomes remarkably stable (Huddy Reference Huddy2001, 131; Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Hawkins, Carlin, Littvay and Kaltwasser2019, 3). Thus, even as the political relevance of the identity rises and falls over time, its charismatic core resists change (Huddy Reference Huddy2001, 149).

This deeply entrenched identity forms the foundation for the survival of charismatic movements. Its role is especially important when the movement finds itself in leaderless situations. During such junctures, the symbolic image of the founder and his promise to deliver salvation maintain the followers’ feelings of hope and loyalty which, in turn, preserve the movement “in abeyance,”Footnote ⁴ helping it cohere for a significant period of time (Taylor Reference Taylor1989).Footnote ⁵ Although the absence of a strong leader during these stretches of time can cause citizens to become politically disengaged, the personalistic nature of their identity sustains their sense of belonging to the founder’s righteous community and provides them with hope that a new leader will eventually rise and take the founder’s place. Thus, when conditions become more favorable, a new leader can politically reactivate the followers’ identity and restore the movement to power (Cramer Reference Cramer2016, 15; Huddy Reference Huddy2001, 148; Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013, 12; Klar Reference Klar2013, 1108; Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser 2019, 3). The next section turns to focus groups with the followers of Peronism and Chavismo to illustrate the process through which citizens’ charismatic attachments to the founder develop into a resilient identity that sustains the movement after the founder’s death.

4.2.1 Research Design

To investigate the survival of charismatic movements from the followers’ perspective, I conducted thirteen focus groups – six in Venezuela and seven in Argentina – with self-identified the followers of Chavismo and Peronism, respectively.Footnote ⁶ In both countries, the focus groups took place in 2016 – 3 years after the death of Hugo Chávez and 42 years after the death of Juan Perón. This timing allowed me to assess the extent to which the followers have maintained charismatic attachments during two important junctures after the disappearance of the founders: in the direct aftermath of the founder’s death, in Venezuela, and decades later, in Argentina. In both cases, the results demonstrate that the founder and his narrative remain central to the followers’ loyalty to the movement. In addition, the Argentine case reveals how the followers can update and even strengthen their personalistic identity based on positive experiences under subsequent movement leaders, whom the followers view as genuine heirs of the founder.

I designed the focus groups with two objectives in mind. First, I sought to probe the nature of the followers’ identification with the movement. Therefore, participants discussed why they considered themselves to be “Chavista” or “Peronist”; what, if anything, continued to inspire them about the movement’s founder; and what characteristics they generally looked for in political leaders. Considering the collective and subjectively understood nature of identities, this portion of the analysis focused on the group as the unit of analysis (Cyr Reference Cyr2016, 234–35; Huddy Reference Huddy2001, 131). Unlike in-depth interviews or surveys, which investigate individual perspectives, the social environment of focus groups enabled participants to collectively contemplate the nature of their shared identity. This approach also revealed key insights about how participants “piece the world together for themselves,” considering not only what constitutes their identity, but also why the identity matters to them (Cramer Reference Cramer2016, 20). A third advantage of the focus group method was that it encouraged participants to reflect on the complex and nuanced nature of their shared identity in a relaxed setting, with the help of fellow group members and the guidance of an expert moderator, rather than undertaking this cognitively difficult task alone (Cyr Reference Cyr2016, 235).

My second reason for conducting focus groups was to explore how followers sustain their identity to the movement in the absence of the founder. I gathered participants’ accounts of their experiences under the founder as well as under subsequent leaders. I also listened to participants describe the symbols they had preserved over the years to commemorate the movement’s leaders and mission of transcendence. This portion of the study focused on the individual followers as the unit of analysis rather than the group. As Cyr indicates, focus groups can be useful for gathering “rapid, individual-level feedback” from a relatively large number of individuals – a larger number than can be achieved through in-depth interviews (Cyr Reference Cyr2016, 234). By capturing group dynamics as well as participants’ individual perspectives, I assessed both the individual and collective aspects of followers’ identification with the movement (Huddy Reference Huddy2001, 146).

To carry out the focus groups, I recruited self-identified followers of the movement from the lower and lower-middle classes in both countries. I selected these citizens as participants because my theory suggests that, having experienced greater socioeconomic marginalization, these individuals constitute the most crucial and consistent support base for both movements.Footnote ⁷ To obtain a range of perspectives, the focus groups were divided between followers who do and do not support the most recent leader of the movement (Cristina Kirchner in Argentina and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela). To the extent possible, focus groups were also divided by age to explore how different generations of followers perceive their attachments to the movement, its founder(s), and subsequent successor(s). All groups were balanced in terms of gender.

I partnered with professional public opinion firms in each country to conduct the focus groups. Trained staff members recruited participants using a quota sampling method and contact lists from each firm’s database. Participants who met the criteria for age, gender, socioeconomic status, movement identification, and geographical location were included.Footnote ⁸ The latter criterion required that participants come from a range of neighborhoods in each city where the focus groups were held. (See more detailed information in the country-specific descriptions presented subsequently.) In selecting participants, the staff ensured that the subjects did not know each other prior to participating in the focus group. Given the non-random method of recruiting participants, the sample cannot be considered as representative of the broader population of followers in either country. Nevertheless, the focus groups revealed valuable information from the perspective of the followers regarding the nature of their identity with the movement, their personal experiences as movement followers, and their impressions of the founder and subsequent leaders.

Experienced local moderators led all focus group discussions. Participants were served light refreshments and received modest monetary compensation for their time. The moderator reassured participants of the confidentiality of the session, encouraged them to express their honest opinions, and guided conversation based on a predesigned script. The scripts for both countries asked participants to reflect on and share why they identify with the movement; specific experiences that drew them toward the movement; positive and negative feelings toward the movement and its different leaders, both past and present; feelings toward the movement’s opponents; thoughts and feelings about the movement’s future; and what activities, objects, or events, if any, have made them feel closer to the movement since the founder’s death (sample questions from each script are listed in online Appendix B).Footnote ⁹

In Venezuela, six focus groups with eight to ten participants each were conducted in partnership with Consultores 21, a renowned, local public opinion firm with ample experience. Due to logistical limitations, participants in all groups were recruited from the capital city of Caracas and its outskirts. Two groups were conducted with adults aged 18 to 25, two groups were conducted with adults aged 26 to 40, and two groups were conducted with adults aged 41 to 55. Participants in three groups (one from each age range) were supportive of Chávez’s current successor, Nicolás Maduro, while participants in the three remaining groups were opposed to Maduro.

In Argentina, seven focus groups with seven to ten participants each were conducted in partnership with Trespuntozero, a local public opinion firm that specializes in political campaigns throughout the country. The focus groups were conducted in three different provinces to obtain a more geographically diverse sample of followers than if the focus groups had been conducted exclusively in the Federal Capital of Buenos Aires. Three groups were held in the Federal Capital, incorporating participants from the city and its outskirts, where many popular sector Peronists reside; two groups were held in Córdoba, the country’s second largest city and a traditionally anti-Peronist stronghold; and two groups were held in La Rioja, a rural, traditionally Peronist region and Menem’s home base, which shares a border with Chile. Six of the seven groups were conducted with adults aged 25 to 55, while one (the third held in Buenos Aires) was conducted with young adults aged 18 to 24.Footnote ¹⁰ Four groups (one per region plus the young adult group in Buenos Aires) were sympathetic to the current Peronist leader, Cristina Kirchner, while three groups (one per region) were opposed to Kirchner.

4.2.2 Results: The Establishment of a Resilient Charismatic Identity

4.3.1 Venezuela

Participants in the Venezuelan focus groups shared cherished memories of their lives during Chávez’s presidency. In particular, their accounts highlighted the deeply personal and unmediated nature of their connections to the leader. For example, one participant recounted:

A second participant recalled meeting Chávez in similar circumstances, when the founder passed through the participant’s neighborhood. Describing the encounter, the participant said:

Notably, this participant switched to present tense when talking about Chávez, suggesting the ongoing spiritual presence of the leader in his life.

Several other participants across the six focus groups shared stories about their personal encounters with Chávez. They consistently reported these events as sentimental and even transformative experiences, as reflected in the following exchange:

In addition to stressing their personal closeness with Chávez, the participants’ stories also emphasized the founder’s extraordinary capacity to resolve their suffering. For example, two participants in separate focus groups said they had written letters to Chávez pleading him to help their sick family members. Both participants claimed that Chávez personally returned their phone calls to arrange treatments for their loved ones. Several others discussed receiving health, nutritional, and educational benefits directly from Chávez, as illustrated in the following conversation:

These statements show that participants perceived Chávez as single-handedly responsible for tangibly improving their loved ones’ lives. Even if their family members received help from missions he established rather than from Chávez himself, the participants viewed the assistance as a personal gift from their beloved leader.

As the participants told these stories, their deep affection for Chávez seemed to reignite itself. Indeed, as described earlier, many spoke of “getting goose bumps” and “good vibes.” Some participants even began to cry as they expressed their love for Chávez, especially when sharing stories about his death. One emotionally described, “It’s incredible, because when he died … it was awe-inspiring to see how the people cried. And when his body passed by [during the funeral procession] I also cried. And you saw all the people there, so many people, and it’s not like the opposition says, that they were paid. They never gave me anything.” Another said, “When Chávez died … you asked how Chávez’s death affected the people … I felt it in my heart. I cried.” Though Chávez died several years before the focus groups were conducted, these sentimental expressions made clear that the participants’ cherished memories of the founder perpetuated their unmediated, personalistic, and profoundly affective bonds with the leader and his movement.

In addition to personal stories, the Venezuelan participants mentioned keeping various objects that symbolized their personal connections to Chávez. Several claimed to own T-shirts embossed with an image of the founder. One explained that wearing the shirt made her feel “a respect, an admiration … he is like a brand, for me. Instead of saying Adidas or Columbia, it says Chávez.” Others described hanging up photographs and posters to commemorate the founder. Still others claimed to keep maps and flags of Venezuela as a reminder of how Chávez had liberated the country. In each of these cases, participants reported displaying the objects with great pride – especially in the face of the movement’s critics – as symbols of their continued loyalty to Chávez’s movement.

4.3.2 Argentina

In contrast to Venezuela, where Chávez recently passed away, the focus groups in Argentina were conducted decades after Perón’s death. Nevertheless, the resulting discussions suggested that, as in Venezuela, personal stories and symbols play an essential role in the perpetuation of followers’ personalistic identification with Peronism.

Crucially, Argentine participants’ stories emphasized personal interactions that their loved ones – namely, parents and grandparents – had had with Perón and Eva during Perón’s original rule, suggesting those individuals had profound attachments to the founder and his wife. In particular, participants highlighted the direct, miraculous impact of the founders’ deeds on their relatives’ lives. One participant described, “I have been Peronist since I was in my mother’s belly. My grandmother was a cook for Perón.” For this participant, the grandmother’s role as a cook for Perón seemed reason enough to justify his own loyalty to the movement decades later. Another participant explained, “Ever since I met my spouse, Perón was burned onto my brain; I listened to all of Evita’s speeches.” Another told a heartfelt story of how she became Peronist through her parents’ experience:

Another participant explained:

While this participant claimed to be Peronist due to “social and economic ideals,” his description of those ideals reflected Perón’s unmediated, charismatic – rather than programmatic – relationship with the poor. Several other participants told similarly vivid, emotional stories of grandparents who personally met and received things from Perón and Eva, such as a small toy “that had been made for the rich,” a sewing machine, and a job as a nurse in Eva’s first hospital. While they did not directly experience the founders’ heroic acts, the participants appeared to cultivate affectionate connections to Perón and Eva vicariously, through stories passed down by their loved ones.

In addition to celebrating the founders as saviors, participants told stories of their interactions with subsequent leaders whom they considered to be genuine heirs of Perón and Eva. These participants noted that they personally benefited from the successors, and therefore considered the leaders to be “true Peronists.” For example, one participant stated, “I am Peronist because Perón gave my grandfather his first job, Menem gave my father his first car, and Néstor gave me my first job.” Another participant claimed to be Peronist because of the benefits she received from Menem and Cristina:

Another participant who prospered during Menem’s presidency painted a romantic vision of Menem riding on horseback to save the country during the 1988 electoral campaign – an image not unlike those described by Venezuelan participants of Chávez riding into their neighborhoods atop a truck. Similarly, a third participant shed tears when he recalled how he got a job that saved him after the 2001 crisis “thanks to Néstor.” A fourth emotionally exclaimed that she supported the Kirchners due to their similarities with Perón and Eva. After listing various material goods that she and her family had received “thanks to Cristina,” ranging from medicine to food to DVD players, she stated, “I am Kirchnerista because [Néstor and Cristina] help the people from below, the poor people, and this is very similar to what my mother experienced in the time of Perón and Evita.”

In short, though participants disagreed with each other regarding whether Menem, Néstor Kirchner, and Cristina Kirchner deserved the label of “true Peronist,” they appeared to judge the three successors based on the same criterion: the leader’s personal provision of material benefits to the participants (or their relatives). The participants suggested that stories of each leader’s largesse served as proof of the leader’s love for the people and, correspondingly, his/her ability to fulfill the Peróns’ legacy. These cherished memories of the leaders – which, notably, were shared after all three successors had fallen from power – clearly played a central role in sustaining the participants’ identification with the movement.Footnote ¹⁹

In addition to recounting stories of their interactions with the movement’s heroic leaders, many participants reported safekeeping symbols that reminded them of these leaders and their mission of salvation. One participant proudly declared that he still had the sewing machine that Eva gave to his grandmother. Another claimed she saved the toy scale – a “rich people’s toy” – that Perón had given to her grandfather during a campaign visit to La Rioja. Other participants saved objects in homage to subsequent movement leaders. For example, several kept T-shirts they had worn when attending rallies with Cristina Kirchner. Some participants in every focus group also reported that they kept photographs of movement leaders – from Juan and Eva Perón to Néstor and Cristina Kirchner – in their homes. The participants noted that they kept these pictures in important places, such as beside their beds or on shelves with portraits of their family members. As indicated in the subsequent discussion, participants suggested that they cherished their photographs of Peronist leaders and considered the leaders to be members of their inner circles:

In a different focus group, a participant further explained the perceived connection between Peronist leaders and family members as follows:

For many participants, material objects ranging from toys to T-shirts to portraits symbolized the powerful, emotional, and intimate connections they – and, importantly, their parents and grandparents – maintained with their beloved leaders. As indicated by these examples, even decades after Perón’s death, symbols have continued to play an important role in perpetuating Peronist followers’ affective and unmediated identification with the movement and profound attachments to its leaders.

5.1.1 A Review of Attachment Formation

I begin by reviewing the three conditions that the founders must satisfy to initially establish charismatic bonds with their followers. These conditions are important because they inform the strategies that successors use later on to reactivate the attachments. First, the founder directly recognizes the suffering of citizens who feel they have been excluded by mainstream society. The founder focuses on these individuals because their unfavorable circumstances make them more likely to look for a savior to rescue them (Bandura Reference Bandura1982; Madsen and Snow Reference Madsen and Snow1991; Merolla and Zechmeister Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2011; Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck Reference Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck2016; Weyland Reference Weyland2003).

Second, to secure these citizens’ devotion, the founder demonstrates the capacity to single-handedly resolve their misery. Specifically, he must provide “proof” of his charismatic power by promising and implementing bold policies that showcase seemingly miraculous abilities (Pappas Reference Pappas2012; Weber Reference Weber, Roth and Wittich1922/1978, 242). From the followers’ perspective, the daring character and capacity of these policies to confer material benefits – rather than programmatic content and long-term sustainability of the policies – are essential for substantiating the leader’s extraordinary abilities. Once implemented, these policies confirm the founder’s superhuman image and can temporarily protect him from subsequent drops in performance (Merolla and Zechmeister Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2011, 30).

Third, the leader cultivates a narrative that glorifies his position as the people’s savior, demonizes opposing groups as enemies blocking the people’s path to salvation, and stresses the founder’s promise to transform the society and deliver prosperity to the followers. This narrative, which frames the leader’s mission as an all-out battle against evil forces, infuses followers’ attachments with a profound moral intensity. Thus, the followers’ support for the leader rests not just on much-needed recognition and tangible goods, but also on a deep sense of righteousness that inspires religious devotion to the leader, whom the followers come to view as brave and selfless (Zúquete Reference Zúquete2008, 106).

As shown in Chapter 4, the founder’s narrative is especially important for the survival of charismatic movements because it develops citizens’ initial attachments into an enduring and deeply personalistic identity. This identity, in turn, shapes the followers’ worldview, reinforces their belief in the founder’s mission of ultimate salvation, and thus influences their political preferences and expectations even after the founder has disappeared. In particular, the identity provides citizens with a “framework that allows [them] … to make sense of social, political, and economic conditions” that occurred in the past, are unfolding in the present, or are yet to occur (Abdelal et al. Reference Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott, Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott2009, 24–25). It also gives these individuals “ways of recognizing, identifying, and classifying other people, of constructing sameness and difference, and of ‘coding’ and making sense of their actions” (Abdelal et al. Reference Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott, Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott2009, 25; Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov Reference Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov2004, 47). As a worldview, then, the followers’ identification with a charismatic leader can shape their perceptions and evaluations of future politicians.

5.1.2 Strategies of Attachment Reactivation

Political psychologists suggest that, over time, various factors can shift the political intensity of a preexisting identity. In other words, the identity can be politically deflated or recharged depending on the circumstances. In the context of charismatic movements, as described in Chapter 4, the prolonged absence of the leader can cause the emotional charge of citizens’ identification with the leader’s charismatic movement to fade. While remaining profoundly attached to the charismatic founder and his redemptive mission, identifiers can become disillusioned with the current political landscape. However, a change in circumstances – specifically, the eruption of a crisis – can make the followers feel threatened and cause them to look for a new savior to rescue them from the situation, which creates the potential for new leaders to reactivate the followers’ attachments to the founder and movement (Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013, 15, 44; Merolla and Zechmeister Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2009a, 27–28; Weyland Reference Weyland2003, 839).

Once a crisis occurs, causing widespread feelings of anxiety and desperation, politicians can strategically manipulate the intensity of citizens’ attachments by portraying themselves as model, “prototypical” members of the group (Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013, 12, 18). Potential successors have several incentives to engage this strategy. Namely, doing so can strengthen the impact of citizens’ attachments on their political preferences and increase political engagement – the combination of which can mobilize a strong base of support for the new leader (Citrin and Sears Reference Citrin and Sears2009, 148; Cramer Reference Cramer2016, 12; Klar Reference Klar2013, 1108). Moreover, research suggests that successors who depict themselves as symbolic archetypes of the identity – that is, the beloved founder – tend to appear more trustworthy and charismatic to fellow identifiers (Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013, 18; Haslam, Reicher, and Platow Reference Haslam, Reicher and Platow2011, 96, 101–3; Hogg Reference Hogg2001, 190).

To reactivate citizens’ attachments, new leaders must disseminate cues through speech, symbolic gestures, and policies that associate the core symbols and values of the identity with the current context and the leader’s personal profile (Cramer Reference Cramer2016, 12; Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013, 12; Klar Reference Klar2013, 1108; Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Meléndez and Kaltwasser2019, 3). Specifically, I argue that successors who enact two cues – one material and one symbolic – similar to those implemented by the founder can reactivate citizens’ deep, unmediated, emotional ties to the movement. If successfully executed, these cues signal to the followers that the leader embodies the founder and is committed to reviving his mission.

In material terms, successors must promise and enact bold, initially successful policies to prove their extraordinary power to rescue the people. This impressive performance signals their potential to fill the founder’s shoes and convinces the followers that the new leaders are capable of delivering salvation. To demonstrate herculean abilities, the successors’ policies must prioritize the rapid delivery of tangible benefits to the followers over programmatic coherence and sustainability. Though it is difficult for successors to implement this cue at the national level before becoming chief executive, past records of bold, impressive performance as subnational executive officeholders – for example, as governors – can provide followers with an initial cue regarding the successors’ potential to fulfill their heroic promises.

Once implemented, this material cue should cause followers to evaluate the successors’ performance in highly favorable terms. More importantly, however, the cue should reignite the followers’ passion for and identification with the movement by convincing them that an authentic savior has emerged to pick up the founder’s baton and deliver a prosperous future. In other words, more than simply demonstrating good performance, this cue should enhance the followers’ emotional attachments to the movement and increase their charismatic perceptions of the successor.

Symbolically, successors must weave themselves into the founder’s narrative by depicting themselves as true heirs and demonstrating their commitment to his mission of societal transformation. This requires successors to update the original narrative to fit with their personae and the contemporary circumstances. To do so, the leaders emphasize aspects of the founder that they share – such as tone of voice, word choice, dress, and physical gestures – while deemphasizing aspects they do not have in common. Additionally, successors can frame their opponents as traditional enemies of the movement to strengthen followers’ support. They can also portray their policies – whose substantive content may differ from the policies of the founder – as achieving the same end goal: providing the followers with immediate relief and eventual salvation. To enact this set of symbolic cues, successors communicate them through verbal, auditory, and visual channels in order to repeatedly remind the followers of the charismatic founder, reinvigorate the followers’ feelings of excitement for the founder’s transformative mission, and convince the followers that the successors are worthy of the founder’s mantle.

In sum, my theory of charismatic attachment reactivation challenges the logic of routinization, which suggests that these affective bonds must transform into depersonalized linkages to survive and remain politically relevant after the founder disappears. Instead, I contend that the followers sustain a deep, emotional identification with the movement that reinforces their commitment to the founder’s heroic mission to transform society, shapes their worldview, and influences their expectations of future politicians. Subsequent leaders can therefore reactivate followers’ attachments and gain support by (1) promising and implementing bold policies that deliver tangible benefits to the followers and (2) symbolically linking themselves to the charismatic founder and his transformative project.

5.2.1 Hypotheses

Based on my theory, I develop three sets of hypotheses about the combined and marginal effects of bold policies and symbolic ties on followers’ charismatic attachments to the movement and support for the successor.

HI. Candidates who combine the material and symbolic cues can revive citizens’ emotional attachments and garner support more effectively than candidates who implement only one or neither of the two cues. Thus:

1. A. Respondents in the fulfilled/symbol condition will express the strongest attachment to the movement. Specifically, they will identify most intensely with the movement and will express the strongest positive feelings and weakest negative feelings toward the movement.

2. B. Respondents in the fulfilled/symbol condition will express the strongest support for the candidate. Specifically, they will perceive the candidate as most charismatic and will express the strongest intentions to vote for the candidate in future elections.

HII. Both bold policies and symbolic ties to the founder are necessary for successors to fully reactivate citizens’ attachments and garner support. The bold policies demonstrate the successor’s charismatic power, while symbolic ties associate the successors’ heroic capacity with the founder and his redemptive mission. Correspondingly, each of the two cues should not be as effective when applied in isolation. Nevertheless, candidates who implement only one of the two cues should elicit stronger attachment and support than candidates who use neither cue. In short:

1. A. Respondents in the fulfilled/no symbol condition and in the unfulfilled/symbol condition will express stronger attachment to the movement than respondents in the unfulfilled/no symbol condition.

2. B. Respondents in the fulfilled/no symbol condition and in the unfulfilled/symbol condition will express stronger support for the candidate than respondents in the unfulfilled/no symbol condition.

HIII. Finally, symbolic ties increase followers’ support for the candidate because they link the candidate directly to the movement’s charismatic founder and thus intensify the followers’ deep, emotional identification with the movement. Therefore:

1. A. Followers’ identification with the movement will mediate the effect of symbolic ties on support for the candidate.

5.2.2 Participants, Design, and Procedure

In partnership with two local public opinion firms – Trespuntozero in Argentina and Consultores 21 in VenezuelaFootnote ² – I conducted face-to-face survey experiments with a sample of each movement’s most important and consistent base of followers: self-identified Peronist and Chavista adults (18 and older) from the “popular” (lower- and lower-middle-class) sectors.Footnote ³ While it would be interesting to analyze the impact of successors’ material and symbolic cues on non-followers as well as middle- and upper-class citizens, I limited the scope of the present study due to theoretical expectations and resource constraints. First, I focused on movement followers rather than all citizens because the experiment aims to test the potential reactivation of existing attachments rather than the formation of new attachments among previously unaffiliated individuals. Certainly, political candidates should also endeavor to expand their support base by incorporating new voters. Yet, because the movement followers constitute a sizeable proportion of the population – about one-third of the electorate in both Argentina and Venezuela (Briceño Reference Briceño2015a; Calvo and Murillo Reference Calvo and Victoria Murillo2012) – earning their loyalty provides new leaders an enviable “electoral cushion” (Levitsky Reference Levitsky2003, 13–14). To narrow the sample in this way, respondents were asked a screening question in which they indicated which of several political traditions they felt closest to. Those who selected “Peronism” or “Chavismo” were included in the study.Footnote ⁴

Second, I limited the sample to followers from the popular rather than the middle and upper classes because my theory suggests that socioeconomically marginalized citizens are more likely to experience seemingly unmanageable challenges, suffer disproportionately, and develop feelings of low self-efficacy. Popular-sector citizens are therefore more likely to look for and become emotionally attached to a leader whom they perceive as heroic (Burns Reference Burns1978 Madsen and Snow Reference Madsen and Snow1991). Furthermore, in both Argentina and Venezuela, these low-income citizens make up the largest group of movement followers and a vital source of support for political candidates (Briceño Reference Briceño2015a; Calvo and Murillo Reference Calvo and Victoria Murillo2012). As suggested by public opinion specialists in both countries, education was used as a proxy for socioeconomic status; respondents with less than a college degree were included.Footnote ⁵

In sum, while the population of interest in this study – movement followers from the popular sectors – is limited, it provides a crucial foundation of support for aspiring political candidates. To approximate a nationally representative sample of this population, the experiment was fielded in three diverse regions of each country: the federal capital and its outskirts, an urban and traditionally anti-Peronist/anti-Chavista region, and a rural, traditionally pro-Peronist/pro-Chavista region (see Table 5.2). Many studies of Peronism and Chavismo focus exclusively on the federal capital, which, while populous and politically important, has distinct characteristics compared to the rest of the country. In contrast, this three-region design better captures the followers’ attitudes and behaviors at the national level, accounting for demographic, cultural, and political variation.

The survey experiment was designed as follows. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions, each of which provided information about a hypothetical governor running for president.Footnote ⁶ After a set of filter questions intended to restrict the sample to individuals from the population of interest, enumerators carefully explained the scenario, verified respondents’ understanding, and proceeded to one of the four randomly assigned experimental manipulations, described below.

To maximize external validity, the two sets of manipulations – one for fulfillment/un-fulfillment of bold policies and a second for the presence/absence of symbolic ties – imitated stimuli that voters would encounter in a real presidential campaign. I developed each manipulation with the assistance and feedback of local campaign strategists, in-depth interviews and pretests with individuals from the population of interest, and, in Argentina, a pilot survey distributed online via email and Facebook (N = 239). To enhance internal validity, the survey was conducted in face-to-face format with local, trained enumerators to ensure that respondents understood the scenario and received the correct manipulations.Footnote ⁷ Manipulation checks (described subsequently) further verified that each stimulus achieved its intended purpose.

For the two conditions in which bold policies were enacted (fulfilled), the enumerator described to the respondent the candidate’s successful completion of bold policies as governor, emphasizing impressive, tangible benefits he provided to popular-sector citizens in his province/state. For the remaining two conditions (unfulfilled), the enumerator indicated the candidate’s failure to implement the same policies as governor. To stress the daring character of the candidate’s policies, exaggerated wording was used, such as the promise to “end” (rather than reduce) poverty, “eliminate” unemployment, and “combat” crime. The policies also addressed real citizens’ most pressing concerns, as indicated by surveys conducted no more than three months prior to fielding the study (economic crisis, unemployment, and poverty in Argentina; economic crisis, crime, and food shortages in Venezuela). Finally, to personalize and enhance the emotional persuasiveness of the scenario, I used an episodic frame (a personal anecdote) rather than a thematic frame (factual information) to depict the candidate’s successful/failed implementation of bold policies (Iyengar Reference Iyengar1994; Klar Reference Klar2013). Prioritizing emotional responses to the candidate’s policies in this way corresponds to my theory that the implementation of bold, initially impressive policies strengthens followers’ charismatic – deeply emotional and personalistic – attachments to the movement.

Next, respondents were exposed to auditory and visual cues representing the presence/absence of the candidate’s symbolic ties to the founder.Footnote ⁸ First, respondents listened to a 90-second speech by the candidate using headphones provided by the enumerator. The speech was recorded rather than printed because voters tend to listen to, rather than read, candidate speeches in the context of presidential campaigns. Each speech was developed based on several real speeches made by prominent movement leaders including Carlos Menem and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina and Nicolás Maduro and Henri Falcón in Venezuela.Footnote ⁹ In each country, local campaign experts with public speaking experience recorded the speech.

In both versions of the speech, the candidate reflected on the country’s current state of affairs and expressed bold promises that he would fulfill if elected. Next, in the two conditions in which symbolic ties were present (symbol), the candidate mentioned the founder by name (Perón/Chávez), referred to the followers using a typical in-group label (comrades/the Bolivarian people), and stressed the transformational character of the movement.Footnote ¹⁰ Conversely, in the two conditions where symbolic ties were absent (no symbol), the candidate did not mention the founder’s name, used a neutral label for the voters (compatriots/the Venezuelan people), and referred to progress in terms of realistic development rather than using the more grandiose and missionary language of transformation. The remaining content, tone, and length of the speech in each country were held constant across all four conditions.

While listening to the candidate’s speech, participants viewed a card with an image of the candidate’s campaign poster, which was also designed based on materials from recent presidential campaigns and feedback from local experts.Footnote ¹¹ Each version of the poster contained a generic campaign slogan (Opportunity for All/Together with the People), a solid color background, an image of children, the candidate’s name, the title “President,” and a picture of the candidate from the chest up.Footnote ¹² In the version with symbolic ties, the background color corresponded to the movement (celeste/red) and the image featured the founder among the children. The version without symbolic ties had a generic background color unaffiliated with any major political party in the country, and the image of children did not include the founder.Footnote ¹³

Following exposure to one of the four randomly assigned conditions, respondents answered a range of survey questions regarding their emotional attachment to the movement and support for the candidate – the dependent variables of the study. To measure emotional attachment, respondents were asked how Peronist/Chavista they felt on a scale from 0 to 10. They were also asked to indicate the intensity of their positive and negative feelings toward the movement on four-point scales including pride, excitement, and hope; anger, disappointment, and fear. Due to the high interitem correlation between the three survey items for positive and negative feelings, respectively, I collapsed each set into an additive index and rescaled it to range from 0 to 10.Footnote ¹⁴ I interpreted statistically significant increases in the former two measures and a significant decrease in the latter as successful reactivation of citizens’ emotional attachments to the movement.Footnote ¹⁵

To measure support for the candidate, respondents were first asked a series of questions regarding their perceptions of the candidate’s charisma. Based on my theory, a compelling leader who materially and symbolically embodies the founder’s heroic image should appear significantly more charismatic to the followers – especially if the candidate is to consolidate his own personalistic authority.

To operationalize the candidate’s charisma, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a four-point scale with three statements about his selflessness, vision of the future, and capacity to solve the country’s problems. While charisma is difficult to measure quantitatively, these items have been validated in previous studies of charisma in Latin America and represent key components of the concept as outlined in my theory. I drew the first two of these statements from a five-question charisma battery developed by Merolla and Zechmeister to assess citizens’ perceptions of leaders’ charisma in Mexico and Venezuela.Footnote ¹⁶ I selected the following items: “[Leader’s name] articulates a compelling vision of the future,” and “[Leader’s name] goes beyond his own self-interest for the good of the group.”Footnote ¹⁷ The first reflects the leader’s enactment of the founder’s mission to establish a more prosperous future for the followers; the second relates to the leader’s willingness to sacrifice personal goals to fulfill this righteous mission on behalf of the followers. I incorporated the third statement – “[the leader] is capable of resolving [Argentina’s / Venezuela’s] problems” – to capture respondents’ perceptions of the leader’s heroic capacity to resolve their misery. Though this statement is not included in Merolla and Zechmeister’s battery, it comprises a central component of my definition of charisma that is also stressed by Weber: the leader’s extraordinary ability to solve the people’s problems. Unlike survey questions in which respondents are prompted to explicitly evaluate the candidate’s economic performance (which was also incorporated in the study as a manipulation check, described subsequently), the broader and more prospective nature of this statement better (if imperfectly) captures whether the candidate inspires and convinces the followers of his/her heroic potential – a crucial component of charisma. I collapsed this three-item charisma battery into an additive index and rescaled to range from 0 to 10.Footnote ¹⁸

In addition to the charisma battery, I included a survey question to measure respondents’ intention to vote for the candidate in future elections. Whereas charismatic perceptions indicate respondents’ potential to form emotional ties to the leader, this item provides a more concrete measure of support that is also necessary for the leader’s consolidation of power. This item was also rescaled to range from 0 to 10 in both countries. Further details regarding all survey questions, including wording and response options, can be found in online Appendix C.

5.2.3 Manipulation Checks

The survey included additional questions to verify that the experimental manipulations had their intended effects. For bold policies, respondents were asked to evaluate the candidate’s performance as governor on a four-point scale. As expected, respondents in the two conditions where the candidate fulfilled bold policies as governor rated his performance significantly higher than respondents in the two conditions where he failed to implement the policies (M_Policies = 3.21 vs. M_{No Policies} = 2.19, p < .05 in Argentina; M_Policies = 3.11 vs. M_{No Policies} = 2.42, p < .05 in Venezuela).

To verify the symbolic manipulation, respondents were asked to evaluate how Peronist/Chavista the candidate appeared on a scale from 0 to 10. On average, respondents in the two conditions with symbolic ties perceived the candidate as more Peronist/Chavista than in the two conditions without symbolic ties (M_Symbol = 6.98 vs. M_{No Symbol} = 6.46, p < .05 in Argentina; M_Symbol = 7.56 vs. M_{No Symbol} = 5.63, p < .05 in Venezuela). These data suggest that respondents in both countries received the correct cues for both sets of manipulations.

5.2.4 Results

For the most part, the results support HI, suggesting that the combined effect of bold policies and symbolic ties cause followers to express the most intense emotional attachment to the movement and the greatest support for the candidate. Specifically, in Argentina, respondents who received both cues (fulfilled/symbol) expressed the strongest identification with Peronism, the most intense positive feelings, and the weakest negative feelings toward the movement, providing strong support for HI(A). Pairwise difference-of-means tests demonstrate that, on average, the joint effects of fulfilled bold policies and symbolic ties had a significantly greater, positive impact on followers’ expressions of emotional attachment based on these three indicators. The differences were statistically significant (p ≤ .09) in seven of nine pairwise comparisons between the fulfilled/symbol condition and each of the remaining conditions. The two differences that did not reach statistical significance – between fulfilled/symbol and unfulfilled/symbol for Peronist identification and for positive feelings toward Peronism – were in the hypothesized direction, with larger scores in the fulfilled/symbol condition.

Likewise, Argentine respondents exposed to both fulfilled bold policies and symbolic ties endorsed the candidate most enthusiastically, supporting HI(B). On average, respondents in the fulfilled/symbol condition perceived the candidate as more charismatic. These respondents also expressed greater willingness to vote for the candidate than respondents in the remaining conditions. All difference-of-means tests between this condition and each remaining condition were positive and significant (p ≤ .076). Figure 5.1A and B present graphical illustrations of the results and Figure 5.2 shows pairwise t-tests between the fulfilled/symbol condition and each of the three remaining conditions (full ANOVA results and p-values for all pairwise t-tests are presented in online Appendix C).

Figure 5.1. Mean levels of movement attachment and candidate support by experimental condition in Argentina

Figure 5.2. Difference of means in Argentina for hypothesis I: Pairwise t-tests

In Venezuela, the results for HI are mixed. To begin, HI(A) is not supported: In terms of movement attachment, respondents expressed equally strong identification with and feelings toward Chavismo across all four conditions, suggesting that neither bold policies nor symbolic ties had a noticeable effect. Moreover, the Venezuelan respondents expressed much higher and more concentrated levels of attachment than their Argentine counterparts. As shown in Table 5.3, in Argentina, the mean score for identification with Peronism across the four conditions was 6.45 with a standard deviation of 2.44, the mean score for positive feelings was 6.67 with a standard deviation of 2.90, and the mean score for negative feelings was 4.08 with a standard deviation of 2.77. Conversely, in Venezuela, the mean score for identification with Chavismo was 8.54 and a standard deviation of 2.12, the mean for positive feelings was 8.87 with a standard deviation of 1.76, and the mean for negative feelings was 1.57 with a standard deviation of 2.17. In other words, overall, the lower intensity and greater dispersion of attachments in Argentina allowed for differences to reveal themselves across the four conditions, whereas the “ceiling effects” for attachment in Venezuela suppressed any potential differences.

I suspect that these ceiling effects emerged in Venezuela due to the recent nature of Chávez’s death, just four years before the survey was conducted. Because Chávez’s followers continue to mourn his passing, it is likely that their attachments to his legacy remain highly activated, resulting in the expression of particularly raw, powerful, and concentrated feelings toward Chavismo – regardless of the behavior of new leaders. Indeed, the survey experiment was administered just four years after Chávez’s death, during the rule of Chávez’s handpicked successor, Nicolás Maduro – who leaned heavily on symbolic connections to Chávez and likely intensified the emotional salience of the founder’s legacy even further. Conversely, Perón died over forty years before the survey was conducted in Argentina. Given the passage of several decades since the founder’s death, followers’ attachments to Peronism are likely to be more nuanced than their Venezuelan counterparts. Argentines who are not exposed to a new leader implementing Peronist cues may therefore be less likely to express their attachments as enthusiastically.

While the Venezuelan respondents’ relatively uniform and intense expressions of attachment to Chavismo fail to provide support for HI(A), the results nevertheless attest to the staying power of charismatic attachments in the wake of the founder’s death. Indeed, the routinization thesis suggests that citizens’ attachments to the movement begin to fade away when the founder disappears, yet in Venezuela, the experimental results suggest that, four years after Chávez’s death, many citizens’ deeply affective attachments to his movement remain as strong as ever. Still, the comparison of results between Venezuela and Argentina suggests that, over the course of several decades, as the founder’s original rule grows more distant, it is possible that the emotional intensity of citizens’ attachments to the movement begins to dissipate – albeit much more slowly than routinization scholars indicate. Furthermore, as will be discussed subsequently, it seems likely that the relative importance of the material and symbolic components of the charismatic attachment may shift over time.

Nevertheless, turning to candidate support, the results in Venezuela uphold HI(B): the combined effects of bold policies and symbolic ties caused followers to express the strongest support for the candidate. On average, relative to all other conditions, respondents in the fulfilled/symbol condition perceived the candidate as significantly more charismatic (p ≈ 0 across all pairwise difference-of-means tests) and were more likely to vote for the candidate in future elections (p ≤ .012 across all pairwise difference-of-means tests). The significance of these findings is noteworthy: while attachments to Chavismo remain strong among all followers, charismatic attachment to and support for new leaders vary based on the extent to which leaders can (a) demonstrate their own heroic capacities by fulfilling bold policies and (b) convincingly tie that heroism to Chávez’s legacy. Thus, to maximize their support, new candidates are incentivized to behave similarly to and associate themselves with the charismatic founder to garner support – actions that perpetuate the founder’s legacy. Figures 5.3A and B present graphical illustrations of the results in Venezuela and Figure 5.4 summarizes pairwise t-tests between the fulfilled/symbol condition and each of the three remaining conditions in Venezuela (full ANOVA results and p-values for all pairwise t-tests are presented in online Appendix C).

Figure 5.3. Mean levels of movement attachment and candidate support by experimental condition in Venezuela

Figure 5.4. Difference of means in Venezuela for hypothesis I: Pairwise t-tests

The results provide partial support for HII. In terms of movement attachment, respondents in Argentina exposed to either bold policies or symbolic ties generally expressed stronger attachment than respondents exposed to neither of the two cues, supporting HII(A). The results were significant in three of four pairwise t-tests (p ≤ .075), and were in the correct direction in the fourth t-test. However, no significant differences were revealed across the three conditions in terms of negative feelings toward the movement, indicating that, unlike the combined effect of the two cues, the marginal effect of each is insufficient to attenuate respondents’ negative sentiments toward the movement.

As for HII(B), the results from Argentina suggest that bold policies by themselves caused respondents to express stronger support for the candidate, whereas symbolic ties had no significant marginal effect. On average, respondents in the fulfilled/no symbol condition perceived the candidate as more charismatic (p ≈ 0) and expressed greater intentions to vote for the candidate (p = .001) than in the unfulfilled/no symbol condition. In contrast, there was no significant difference between the unfulfilled/symbol condition and the unfulfilled/no symbol condition. These findings suggest that the impact of symbolic ties on voters’ support for the candidate is not as strong as the impact of bold policies. Figure 5.5 displays pairwise t-tests pertaining to Hypothesis II in Argentina.

Figure 5.5. Difference of means in Argentina for hypothesis II: Pairwise t-tests

In Venezuela, no significant differences emerged across the four conditions in terms of movement attachment due to the ceiling effects described earlier. However, the results indicate that the marginal effects of bold policies and symbolic ties significantly influenced the respondents’ support for the candidate, providing partial support for HII(B). On average, respondents in the fulfilled/no symbol and unfulfilled/symbol conditions perceived the candidate as more charismatic than respondents in unfulfilled/no symbol condition (p ≈ 0 and p = .010, respectively). Furthermore, respondents in the unfulfilled/symbol condition expressed significantly greater willingness to vote for the candidate than respondents in the unfulfilled/no symbol condition (p = .054). Figure 5.6 displays pairwise t-tests pertaining to these results in Venezuela.

Figure 5.6. Difference of means in Venezuela for hypothesis II: Pairwise t-tests

A comparison of the results for HII(B) across Argentina and Venezuela yields further insights regarding the marginal effects of the material and symbolic cues on support for the candidate. As Figures 5.1B and 5.3B illustrate, in Argentina, the marginal effect of the material cue surpassed that of the symbolic cue, whereas in Venezuela, the opposite occurred: the marginal effect of the symbolic cue prevailed over the material cue. In other words, on average, Argentine respondents found the candidate who fulfilled bold policies yet had no symbolic ties to Perón to be more charismatic and worthier of their vote; in contrast, Venezuelan respondents tended to prefer the candidate who did not fulfill the policies yet demonstrated his symbolic connection to Chávez!

These findings suggest that the importance of the symbolic and material dimensions of charisma may vary over time, especially as they concern successors’ ability to convince the followers they are worthy of the founder’s mantle. Specifically, it is possible that, in the aftermath of the founder’s disappearance, successors must rely more heavily on the symbolic dimension to portray themselves as rightful heirs. Yet with the passage of time, the material dimension – in particular, the heroic performance of new leaders – may become increasingly consequential for proving their capacity to pick up the founder’s baton and revive the movement. Although these findings are speculative, they reveal interesting nuances about the unique effects of the different dimensions of charisma and open up avenues for future research.

To conclude, the findings reveal that the marginal effects of bold policies and symbolic ties influence followers’ expressions of emotional attachment to the movement, their perceptions of the new leader’s charisma, and their likelihood to vote for the new leader in future elections – though these effects are weaker than the joint effect of the two cues. Interestingly, the marginal effects of each cue vary according to the historical position of the charismatic movement: In Argentina, where the movement’s founder died decades ago, the impact of the symbolic cue is relatively weaker than in Venezuela, where the founder died very recently and the movement remains in power. Still, in both countries, the fulfillment of bold policies appears to have a strong marginal effect on support for the candidate (with the exception of vote intention in Venezuela, perhaps due to the strength of symbolic ties in the current political climate). In contrast, symbolic ties are potentially more important than bold policies for reviving followers’ attachments to the movement. These results reinforce my theory that new leaders must fulfill material and symbolic cues to fully revive the movement in their own name.

Finally, to further examine whether symbolic ties increase followers’ support for the candidate by enhancing their identification with the movement, I turn to the third hypothesis. Following Imai, Keele, and Tingley (Reference Imai, Keele and Tingley2010), I estimate the average causal mediation effect of movement identification on the relationship between symbolic ties and followers’ support for the candidate, measured as charismatic perceptions and vote intention (see online Appendix C for equations and full output of the analysis). In Argentina, the results uphold this hypothesis. The direct and total effects of symbolic ties on charismatic perceptions and vote intent are not significant. More importantly, however, movement attachment has a positive, significant effect (see Table 5.4).Footnote ¹⁹ In other words, the symbolic cue has a significant but indirect effect on candidate support: Exposure to symbolic ties increases followers’ support for the candidate by intensifying their identification with the movement. Thus, although the results from HII(B) suggest that the influence of the symbolic cue on candidate support may have faded in Argentina in the decades since Perón’s death, the mediation analysis suggests the lingering influence of the symbolic cue on followers’ identification with the movement. In Venezuela, due to the ceiling effects for movement identification across the four experimental conditions, the results were not significant. Nevertheless, the Argentine findings underscore that, in addition to proving their own impressive leadership by implementing bold policies, successors who want to maximize their support should link themselves to the founder and his heroic mission to reactivate followers’ attachments to the movement.