The significance of the form and extent of military forces in post-Dayton BiH extends beyond simply the capacity to wage war. As Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess illustrate, the demobilisation of troops produced a significant social crisis, as working-age (predominantly) men returned to communities with which they were often unfamiliar without employment opportunities or suitable education alternatives. Within the armed forces the story was similarly disjointed, the shrunken BiH military was divided down ethnic lines, reflecting the divisions endorsed at the GFAP, while the various military forces benefitted from material support from sympathetic neighbouring countries. Security-sector reform, then, became a key element of state formation: it was clear that the Weberian imaginary of a monopoly of legitimate violence over a given territory would be a future accomplishment rather than an outcome of a peace treaty. This chapter explores the interventions made in the attempt to reconstruct military forces in BiH, exploring how these processes have enrolled various international and domestic actors in new legal relationships and conflicts. These processes of enrolment have a strong bearing on the overarching argument concerning the edge of law in BiH. The reorganisation of the military was presented by intervening agencies as a central component of an ‘exit strategy’, performing a separation between the site of intervention and the temporary presence of an intervening agency. In a sense: an enactment of the edge. But this chapter argues these performances would be better framed as ‘entrance strategies’, heralding new and often covert forms of intervention. It seems an appropriate empirical and theoretical point on which to end the book: that the passage of time does not lead to the inevitable strengthening of state sovereignty and the exit of international influence. Instead we need to carefully trace how imaginations of ‘exit’ create new forms of dependence, reliance and influence.