Introduction

Although it is commonly called a positive theory – to imply that it is purely descriptive and without value assumptions – rational choice theory is typically grounded in a powerful and simple value theory, from which many of its most compelling results follow. In actual applications, the word “rational” in rational choice theory is typically not a merely formal term. It is also a substantive term that refers to particular values, essentially welfare values. It may be true, as some rational choice theorists insist, that the theory could be applied to actors whose values are other than welfare and, especially, other than their own welfare. But the remarkable success of rational choice explanations turns on the surprising power they have when they are grounded almost exclusively in the actors' own welfares.

To this extent, rational choice theory is, practically, a two-fold theory that says what values govern individuals' choices and what the result of those choices will be. Often, the result is collective rather than merely individual, although rational choice explanations are strictly at the individual level and can govern individual actions outside social interactions as well as within such interactions. In the discussion here, however, I will focus on rational choice explanations of social-political interactions, including large group interactions.

A common complaint against rational choice theory is that it mistakes concern with self-interest for rationality. The complaint is well grounded but pointless. Rational choice theorists commonly do suppose that the agent's own welfare is the chief value of concern to the agent. But there is no mistake involved in such an assumption.