The approach to ethics we've been developing rests on a single principle – moral responsibility. Up to this point, on the assumption that moral responsibility is a function of moral consciousness (consciousness in the realm of moral affairs), we've merely postulated this principle, not fully discussed it. Moral consciousness is a kind of judge that pronounces sentences on our actions and those of others. Because we judge ourselves as well as others, we felt justified in arguing that moral responsibility is the foundation of theoretical ethics. Moral consciousness can be clear or muddled, conscious or unconscious, mistaken or sound, enlightened or ignorant – but no one is completely without it. And because moral consciousness is universal, so is moral responsibility.

From this we deduced that human activity is governed by a moral law. Inquiring into the nature of this law, we examined, in order, morality and interest, the ethics of sentiment, and the morality of Kant. We concluded that the foundation of the moral law lies in the idea of finality – a conclusion that has two advantages:

1. The idea of finality has immediate implications for action, so that passion and calculations of interest need not play any role in ethics;

2. Men need not attempt actions that would be absurd or impossible.

The very conception of our end implies the will to realize it.