The boycott was in trouble. Lloyd Cutler knew this. He also knew it was his job to get results. Despite this realization, the boycott campaign continued to bleed out, taking one of its worst defeats before the month ended. The problem was that the administration continued to have trouble staying focused. The nature of the global economy caught Carter, Cutler, and the rest of the administration short. Economic and commercial issues absorbed an enormous amount of attention from the administration and also showed to what lengths Jimmy Carter was prepared to go to implement his policy.

There were a number of U.S. firms with ties to the Olympics. Some were major corporations, while others were medium-sized firms or privately owned businesses. Both types of business had different relationships with the Olympics, and many remained skeptical about the Carter administration’s prospects of success. In mid-January, The Wall Street Journal took a survey of fifty executive and found only four in support of the policy. Most preferred to take no position and see how things developed. Ambassador Dobrynin had no illusions about the power of these capitalists, even if such a view contradicted Communist theory. In his memoirs, he wrote, “Carter publicly called for a boycott of the summer Olympic Games in Moscow, an appeal that a number of companies who had committed themselves to supporting the athletes told us privately they could not challenge.”