Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Notation, definitions and two fundamental theorems
- 3 The existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for finite sets of discrete alternatives
- 4 Arrovian social welfare functions, nonmanipulable voting procedures and stable group decision functions
- 5 Restrictions on the distribution of individuals' preferences
- 6 The existence of social choice rules in n-dimensional continuous space
- 7 Concluding remarks
- References
- Author index
- Subject index
2 - Notation, definitions and two fundamental theorems
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Notation, definitions and two fundamental theorems
- 3 The existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for finite sets of discrete alternatives
- 4 Arrovian social welfare functions, nonmanipulable voting procedures and stable group decision functions
- 5 Restrictions on the distribution of individuals' preferences
- 6 The existence of social choice rules in n-dimensional continuous space
- 7 Concluding remarks
- References
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
The notation and definitions which we are introducing in this chapter will remain valid throughout chapters 2–5 Chapter 6 will use a somewhat different terminology.
Let X = {x,y,z, …} denote the set of all conceivable social states and let N = {1, …, n} denote a finite set individuals or voters (n ≥ 2). Let R stand for a binary relation on X; R is a subset of ordered pairs in the product X × X. We interpret R as a preference relation on X. Without any index, R refers to the social preference relation. When we speak of individual i's preference relation we simply write Ri. The fact that a pair (x, y) is an element of R will be denoted xRy; the negation of this fact will be denoted by ¬xRy. R is reflexive if for all x Є X: xRx. R is complete if for all x,y Є X,x ≠ y: xRy or yRx. R is said to be transitive if for all x,y,z Є X: (xRy ∧ yRz) → xRz. The strict preference relation (the asymmetric part of R) will be denoted by P: xPy ↔ [xRy ∧ ¬yRx]. The indifference relation (the symmetric part of R) will be denoted by I: xIy ↔ [xRy ∧ yRx]. We shall call R a preference ordering (or an ordering or a complete preordering) on X if R reflexive, complete and transitive.
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- Information
- Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory , pp. 11 - 16Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2001