Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- AUTHOR'S NOTE
- INTRODUCTION DEFRAUDING DEMOCRACY THROUGH NONCONSENSUAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES
- PART ONE THE POLITICAL ASSAULT ON STATE POWERS AND THE FRAMEWORK FOR AUTHORITARIANISM
- PART TWO INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT TOWARD CONSOLIDATING AUTHORITARIANISM
- PART THREE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS DESIGNED TO CONSOLIDATE AUTHORITARIANISM
- Chapter 10 THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE AN AUTHORITARIAN AND ANTIDEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE CONSTITUTION
- Chapter 11 THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE A CENTRALIZED STATE IN THE CONSTITUTION
- Chapter 12 THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE A SOCIALIST CENTRALIZED ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN THE CONSTITUTION
- Chapter 13 THE IRREGULAR FRAUDULENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REJECTED CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM THROUGH LEGISLATION
- Chapter 14 THE ILLEGITIMATE MUTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
- Chapter 15 THE ALTERNATE PRINCIPLE OF GOVERNMENT AND THE 2009 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON CONTINUOUS REELECTION
- FINAL REFLECTIONS: THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY AND ITS VIOLATION BY VENEZUELA'S AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT: SOME RELEVANT FACTS FROM THE PAST DECADE
- INDEX
Chapter 14 - THE ILLEGITIMATE MUTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- AUTHOR'S NOTE
- INTRODUCTION DEFRAUDING DEMOCRACY THROUGH NONCONSENSUAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES
- PART ONE THE POLITICAL ASSAULT ON STATE POWERS AND THE FRAMEWORK FOR AUTHORITARIANISM
- PART TWO INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT TOWARD CONSOLIDATING AUTHORITARIANISM
- PART THREE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS DESIGNED TO CONSOLIDATE AUTHORITARIANISM
- Chapter 10 THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE AN AUTHORITARIAN AND ANTIDEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE CONSTITUTION
- Chapter 11 THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE A CENTRALIZED STATE IN THE CONSTITUTION
- Chapter 12 THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE A SOCIALIST CENTRALIZED ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN THE CONSTITUTION
- Chapter 13 THE IRREGULAR FRAUDULENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REJECTED CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM THROUGH LEGISLATION
- Chapter 14 THE ILLEGITIMATE MUTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
- Chapter 15 THE ALTERNATE PRINCIPLE OF GOVERNMENT AND THE 2009 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON CONTINUOUS REELECTION
- FINAL REFLECTIONS: THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY AND ITS VIOLATION BY VENEZUELA'S AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT: SOME RELEVANT FACTS FROM THE PAST DECADE
- INDEX
Summary
According to the 1999 Constitution, its provisions can be reviewed and modified only through the specific means established for such purpose, that is, the convening of a National Constituent National Assembly; the proposing, sanctioning, and popular approving of a “constitutional reform”; or the proposing and popular approving of a “constitutional amendment” (Articles 340–349). The common trend of all these constitutional review procedures is that the intervention of the people through referenda is always required for the Constitution to be modified, so no constitutional review is possible without the vote of the people. Any other modification, reform, or amendment to the Constitution adopted through any other means is to be considered illegitimate.
That is why, in 2007, in order to modify the Constitution for the purpose of reinforcing the authoritarian, socialist, centralized, and militaristic state that has been built during the past decade, the president proposed an extensive “constitutional reform” that after being sanctioned by the National Assembly was rejected by the people in the December 2007 referendum. After this defeat, the following year, the National Assembly sanctioned a “constitutional amendment” draft in order to implement one aspect of the 2007 reforms proposals rejected by the people, referred to the continuous and indefinite possibility for reelection of the president and other elected officials, which eventually was approved in the referendum that took place in February 2009.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Dismantling Democracy in VenezuelaThe Chávez Authoritarian Experiment, pp. 335 - 358Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010