The 1999 Constitution kept many provisions of the 1961 Constitution and mixed them with new principles and intents, in some cases confused with constitutional rights, including some important contradictions like the declaration of the State as a “decentralized federation,” paralleling provisions that have further centralized the centralized federation the country had for more than one hundred years. Regarding the democratic character of the government, it emphasized participatory means but eroded the representative nature of democracy in an antiparty framework. Furthermore, the Constitution formally declares the rule of law but within a militaristic framework never before established by any previous constitution. The separation of powers was formally expressed, adding to the traditional ones (legislative, executive, and judicial) two new additional branches of government, the electoral and citizens' branches, but with a clear prevalence of the legislative power (National Assembly) over the others.

I began to analyze the 1999 Constitution and to make critical comments on its contents as a member of the National Constituent Assembly that drafted the Constitution. I strongly opposed its approval in the December 15, 1999 referendum, and began to write on the matter just a few weeks after the approval of the Constitution. The comments on the Constitution have been developed in further works, in which I have studied the constitutional text in depth. For the purpose of this book, I summarize in this and the following chapter the main aspects of the 1999 Constitution that can be considered as important reforms.