Book contents
- The Disabled Contract
- Cambridge Disability Law and Policy Series
- The Disabled Contract
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Severe Intellectual Disability and the Social Contract
- 2 Inclusive Contractarianism
- 3 The Capacity to Trust as a Contractual Basis for Robust Moral Status
- 4 People with Severe Intellectual Disabilities as Active Citizens
- 5 People with Severe Intellectual Disabilities as Passive Citizens
- 6 Other-Regarding Concern and Exploitation
- 7 Beyond Contractual Relations
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - Other-Regarding Concern and Exploitation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 March 2021
- The Disabled Contract
- Cambridge Disability Law and Policy Series
- The Disabled Contract
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Severe Intellectual Disability and the Social Contract
- 2 Inclusive Contractarianism
- 3 The Capacity to Trust as a Contractual Basis for Robust Moral Status
- 4 People with Severe Intellectual Disabilities as Active Citizens
- 5 People with Severe Intellectual Disabilities as Passive Citizens
- 6 Other-Regarding Concern and Exploitation
- 7 Beyond Contractual Relations
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This chapter explores feminist contractarianism, which suggests that the morality of private relationships should be assessed from a self-interested point of view, in part because other-regarding concern may play a role in exploiting parties in intimate relationships. Variants of feminist contractarianism draw from both Kantian and Hobbesian strands of contractarianism (which I, respectively, call contractualism and contractarianism). I suggest that the feminist contractarian criticism of other-regarding concern overreaches. While other-regarding concern can indeed be connected with exploitation, systematically replacing it with a self-regarding stance goes too far. Other-regarding concern is an important moral attitude, not only in private relationships but also within social ethics and theories of justice, which cannot, in my view, satisfactorily account for the robust moral status of PSID without incorporating it. Showing how contractual theory underestimates other-regarding concern even in a context where it is most plausibly relevant informs us of why it could similarly fail in the wider context of justice between strangers.
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- Information
- The Disabled ContractSevere Intellectual Disability, Justice and Morality, pp. 216 - 272Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021