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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
ERROR – THE DENIAL OF FINAL CAUSES – DIVINE GOODNESS (AT VII:58–62)
Error results, the Meditator decides, when I opt to believe a proposition … but not because I clearly understand that reasons of truth point that way, or when I opt to act in a certain manner … but not because I clearly understand that reasons of goodness point that way. In such cases, I am merely exercising my low-grade freedom:
So what then is the source of my mistakes? It must simply be this: the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect; but instead of restricting it within the same limits, I extend its use to matters which I do not understand. Since the will is indifferent in such cases, it easily turns aside from what is true and good, and this is the source of my error and sin.
(vii:58)If I make an epistemological error, it follows that I employed my will improperly, embracing a proposition without having sufficient grounds for doing so. If I make a moral error (“sin” in the Meditator's terms), I engaged my will to perform some action despite my knowledge that it was wrong, or because I failed to perceive its wrongness. Does it follow, though, that whenever I embrace a proposition without having sufficient grounds for doing so, or act spontaneously without much consideration, I make a mistake?
The position that we always make errors when exercising our low-grade freedom seems overstated.
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