Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introductory essay
- General introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text and the translation
- Meditations on First Philosophy
- First Meditation: What can be called into doubt
- Second Meditation: The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body
- Third Meditation: The existence of God
- Fourth Meditation: Truth and falsity
- Fifth Meditation: The essence of material things, and the existence of God considered a second time
- Sixth Meditation: The existence of material things, and the real distinction between mind and body
- Selections from the Objections and Replies
- Index
- Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy
Third Meditation: The existence of God
from Meditations on First Philosophy
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introductory essay
- General introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text and the translation
- Meditations on First Philosophy
- First Meditation: What can be called into doubt
- Second Meditation: The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body
- Third Meditation: The existence of God
- Fourth Meditation: Truth and falsity
- Fifth Meditation: The essence of material things, and the existence of God considered a second time
- Sixth Meditation: The existence of material things, and the real distinction between mind and body
- Selections from the Objections and Replies
- Index
- Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy
Summary
I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will eliminate from my thoughts all images of bodily things, or rather, since this is hardly possible, I will regard all such images as vacuous, false and worthless. I will converse with myself and scrutinize myself more deeply; and in this way I will attempt to achieve, little by little, a more intimate knowledge of myself. I am a thing that thinks: that is, a thing that doubts, affirms, denies, understands a few things, is ignorant of many things, is willing, is unwilling, and also which imagines and has sensory perceptions; for as I have noted before, even though the objects of my sensory experience and imagination may have no existence outside me, nonetheless the modes of thinking which I refer to as cases of sensory perception and imagination, in so far as they are simply modes of thinking, do exist within me – of that I am certain.
In this brief list I have gone through everything I truly know, or at least everything I have so far discovered that I know. Now I will cast around more carefully to see whether there may be other things within me which I have not yet noticed. I am certain that I am a thinking thing. Do I not therefore also know what is required for my being certain about anything? In this first item of knowledge there is simply a clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting; this would not be enough to make me certain of the truth of the matter if it could ever turn out that something which I perceived with such clarity and distinctness was false. So I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.
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- Descartes: Meditations on First PhilosophyWith Selections from the Objections and Replies, pp. 24 - 36Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996