Introduction

Our major reason for departing from economic orthodoxy in the matter of the motivational structure of individuals derives from a concern to extend the scope of rational actor analysis to include a range of ideas which are relatively familiar in the literature on constitutional politics and which seem to us to be central to any rounded constitutional analysis. Chief among these ideas is the concern to view constitutions in terms of the design of institutions which strike a balance between three considerations: the limitation of government powers; the expression of political opinion through processes of deliberation and representation that refine private opinions and select the most virtuous for office; and the maintenance of an environment which encourages individuals to participate in politics in an appropriate spirit. While an entirely orthodox economic analysis of constitutional design can easily recognise the first of these three elements, and can provide valuable insights into means by which power may be constrained, it seems destined to fail to provide an account of the second and third elements, since it cannot recognise the relevant categories.