This book is an exercise in rational actor political theory or ‘public choice’ theory. (We shall use the two terms without discriminating.) However, the discussion is unusual in two respects. First, it focuses attention on a range of institutional devices that, although common enough in democratic practice and in constitutional analysis in other traditions, have been somewhat under-analysed within the rational actor tradition. Second, it adopts a more moralised conception of agent desires than rational actor analysis normally assumes. In this initial chapter, we want to say something about what the devices in question are, and speculate as to why they have been relatively ignored within the rational actor tradition. We shall then briefly discuss our picture of desires and agent motivation, and indicate how that picture differs from the standard, more determinedly egoistic one. Because devices and desires are not independent, we also want to direct attention to some aspects of their interconnectedness. Finally, we will offer some guidance to the reader on the organisation and structure of the remainder of the book.

But before any of this, a preliminary comment on our title, and on our use of ‘devices’ and ‘desires’ is in order.