Dahl discusses several aspects of the feasibility of democracy in an international setting. He is pessimistic, convincingly so. Let me mention some thoughts about his topic that may reflect the disciplinary perspective of an economist.

Governance of international institutions

Typically the members are nation states, and the organization operates under a constitution agreed by treaty among them. The members are often vastly different in population, and they are usually not all democracies. What would democratic governance mean? Even if all members were democracies, they would not be likely to agree that each member have votes proportionate to its population. For example, the countries whose pecuniary contributions are essential to the functioning of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund are not about to let China run these institutions. Germany and France are not about to let the new euro central bank be run by a board of EU member representatives with votes weighted by population.

Exit as a substitute for voice

Albert Hirschman (1970) pointed out that internal democracy is not the only possible source of moral legitimacy for an institution. If membership is voluntary, if “exit” is permissible and not terribly costly, then governance by “voice” of members is not essential. Indeed it may be unfair to let members with transient attachments participate in governance on equal terms with those having long records of “loyalty” – a third Hirschman concept. Exit is fair when competing institutions exist or can be established.