Introduction

In this chapter, I claim that the Rikerian legacy is the most influential force in the discipline of political science, but that its reign is controversial. I distinguish the doctrine of democratic irrationalism from rational choice theory in general, and express qualified support for rational choice theory. In this volume, I do not defend the entirety of democratic principles, only the one narrow but essential principle of the possibility of the accurate and fair social amalgamation of individual opinions and wants. In his Liberalism against Populism, an interpretation of the results of social choice theory, Riker (1982) makes an apparently powerful case against the very intelligibility of majoritarian democracy. I introduce his contrast between liberalism and populism. What everyone else calls democracy, Riker labels populism, a term with pejorative connotations. Such populism is shown by social choice theory to be impossible, he claims. In its stead, he offers liberalism, which he defines to be the random removal of public officials. This liberalism is the only democracy we can expect after social choice theory, he says. Finally, it is not widely appreciated that Riker's central argument against populist democracy is that the preferences of citizens are unknowable. I begin the volume's analysis by showing that the most central argument in the irrationalist scheme is self-contradictory and otherwise mistaken.

Commander Riker and Starship Rochester

I have taken pains to illustrate the general reception of Arrow's theorem, and have provided some indications of Riker's influence.