Since Athens, as we have seen, critics have targeted democracy for its tendency to change its laws. In the post–World War II world, such arguments have taken on new force: The flexibility of the Weimar Constitution is often taken to be a contributing cause of the rise of Nazism and the ensuing human tragedy. At the time, the risk that democracy could by democratic means, perhaps through established amendment procedures, turn itself into dictatorship seemed very grave indeed. In light of such an argument, to reject entrenchment may seem to be not only obtuse but perhaps even inhumane. As a result, in transitional societies – particularly in transitions from regimes marked by humanitarian disaster – entrenchment seems to be an obvious and wholly uncontroversial decision. Who would challenge the German desire to enact such a rule in the wake of atrocities? The German protection of human dignity, with federalism and the democratic order, thus represents the hardest case for an argument against entrenchment.

Predictably, scholars regularly regard the decision to entrench in Germany as the inevitable response by the framers to the deficiencies of Weimar and a cri de coeur against Nazism. It is reasonable, of course, that such a view would be widespread. It makes intuitive sense that the framers would have wished to respond to the deficiencies in the Weimar Constitution – including, arguably, its mutability – that aided Hitler's ascent to power. However, such a story is at best incomplete.