Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Note on Sources and Texts
- Introduction
- 1 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Wage War against the Church
- 2 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Accept the Peace Agreement that the Duke of Milan is Offering
- 3 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Launch a War of Aggression against Lucca
- 4 On Whether or Not the King of France Should Make Peace with the Duke of Milan
- 5 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Sign an Offensive Alliance with the King of France
- 6 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the King of the Romans or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 7 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the Emperor or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 8 On Whether the Emperor Should Be Magnanimous towards the King of France, Whom He Holds Prisoner, or Impose Severe Terms on Him
- 9 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Risk War against Him
- 10 On Whether the Pope Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Wage War against Him
- 11 On Whether the Emperor Should Make an Agreement with the Italian States or the King of France
- Name index
- Subject index
10 - On Whether the Pope Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Wage War against Him
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 April 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Note on Sources and Texts
- Introduction
- 1 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Wage War against the Church
- 2 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Accept the Peace Agreement that the Duke of Milan is Offering
- 3 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Launch a War of Aggression against Lucca
- 4 On Whether or Not the King of France Should Make Peace with the Duke of Milan
- 5 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Sign an Offensive Alliance with the King of France
- 6 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the King of the Romans or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 7 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the Emperor or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 8 On Whether the Emperor Should Be Magnanimous towards the King of France, Whom He Holds Prisoner, or Impose Severe Terms on Him
- 9 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Risk War against Him
- 10 On Whether the Pope Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Wage War against Him
- 11 On Whether the Emperor Should Make an Agreement with the Italian States or the King of France
- Name index
- Subject index
Summary
When Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici was elected pope as Clement VII, on 19 November 1523, many expected that he would be an important ally to Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, in his struggle against Francis I, King of France. After all, the Cardinal had been the leader of the philo-imperial movement at the Roman Curia for quite some time, for he believed that a concerted effort with the Emperor was necessary not only to oppose the spread of Lutheranism but also to rid the Church of the French presence in Lombardy, as Francis's seizure of the Duchy of Milan, in 1515, had resulted in a serious constraint on any further expansion of the papal dominions in the Po Valley. In the last period of the pontificate of Leo X – the previous Medici pope – the Cardinal supported the creation of an anti-French alliance with Charles (May 1521). The military operations, in which he participated in person as Pontifical Legate, led to the expulsion of the French from Milan – where Francesco Sforza was proclaimed duke – and the papal occupation of Piacenza and Parma, in the autumn of 1521. Similarly, during the brief pontificate of Adrian VI (1522–3), the Cardinal played an active role in convincing the Pope to sign another anti-French alliance with the Emperor in August 1523. More generally, as Guicciardini writes in The History of Italy (XVI, i),
during the reign of Leo [X] and after his own promotion to the cardinalship, he took a world of pains for advancing the grandeur of Caesar, and […] Leo and he, with excessive cost and danger, opened the way to so great a power in Italy.
In light of all this, it is not surprising that Charles looked at Cardinal de’ Medici as a most reliable friend and supported his election with all his influence (and quite a lot of money).
Yet, after his assumption to the Pontificate,
either on considering that it belonged to his office to act as a father and common pastor between Christian princes, and to be rather a peacemaker than a fomenter of wars, or beginning, though late, to be alarmed at so much power, (ibid.)
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- Chapter
- Information
- Debating Foreign Policy in the RenaissanceSpeeches on War and Peace by Francesco Guicciardini, pp. 129 - 165Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2017