Book contents
- The Culture of Military Organizations
- The Culture of Military Organizations
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Theoretical Frameworks
- Part II Land Forces
- 3 Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee
- 4 “Playing a Very Bold Game”
- 5 German Army Culture, 1871–1945
- 6 The Culture of the Indian Army, 1900–1947
- 7 An Army Apart
- 8 The Culture of the British Army, 1914–1945
- 9 Imperial Japanese Army Culture, 1918–1945
- 10 Military Culture, Military Efficiency, and the Red Army, 1917–1945
- 11 An Army Like No Other
- 12 The Weight of the Shadow of the Past
- 13 US Army Culture, 1973–2017
- Part III Maritime Forces
- Part IV Air Forces
- Conclusion
- Index
4 - “Playing a Very Bold Game”
The Organizational Culture of the Army of Northern Virginia, 1862–1865
from Part II - Land Forces
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2019
- The Culture of Military Organizations
- The Culture of Military Organizations
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Theoretical Frameworks
- Part II Land Forces
- 3 Ulysses S. Grant and the Culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee
- 4 “Playing a Very Bold Game”
- 5 German Army Culture, 1871–1945
- 6 The Culture of the Indian Army, 1900–1947
- 7 An Army Apart
- 8 The Culture of the British Army, 1914–1945
- 9 Imperial Japanese Army Culture, 1918–1945
- 10 Military Culture, Military Efficiency, and the Red Army, 1917–1945
- 11 An Army Like No Other
- 12 The Weight of the Shadow of the Past
- 13 US Army Culture, 1973–2017
- Part III Maritime Forces
- Part IV Air Forces
- Conclusion
- Index
Summary
When Gen. Robert E. Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 1, 1862, it was essentially an amalgamation of units, not a united force. Lee gave the army a distinctive organizational culture based on his belief that if the Confederacy were to win the war, it would have to do so quickly. This necessitated an operational strategy that emphasized seizing the initiative, even though his army always faced a numerically superior foe. Implementation of this strategy required aggressive leadership at all levels, particularly among Lee’s top subordinates. Lee secured this kind of leadership by systematically ridding himself of senior lieutenants who proved cautious in battle while forgiving mistakes, even expensive ones, on the part of subordinates who showed themselves to be offensive-minded. This “embedding mechanism,” as specialists in management science would call it, sent an unmistakable signal to the rest of the army’s leaders that they were expected to be bold in action. Lee’s aggressive strategy sought to destroy the enemy army, but his ultimate goal was to demoralize Northern public opinion, which he regarded as the Union’s center of gravity. Although he failed to accomplish this, Lee's many battlefield victories made his army the focus of Confederate nationalism, so that his surrender at Appomattox equated with the death of the Confederacy.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Culture of Military Organizations , pp. 79 - 99Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019