9.2.1 Mutual Collaboration Originates from Gestural Communication

According to Tomasello (2008), it is plausible that humans’ skills and motives for shared intentionality initially emerged through mutualistic collaborative activities. When two individuals act together jointly, they naturally attend to the same situation. However, joint attention is not enough; the individuals must also know that they are attending to the situation together. Great apes do not engage with others in this type of joint attention, whereas human infants, quite amazingly, do it from before they are only one year old (Tomasello, Reference Tomasello2016).

In evolution, these joint intentional activities would have started in the immediate close interaction between individuals, beginning with the gestures of pointing and pantomiming. When two individuals are working toward a joint goal in close interaction, both benefit by helping each other. Giving and receiving help will be easier when both parties engage in a closely intertwined collaborative activity. In this context, helping behavior might naturally develop as a way of facilitating progress toward a joint goal. The basic cognitive skill that is required is recursive mindreading, which implies that we both know we are cooperative.

This joint attention also makes communication toward a joint goal possible. Communicators and recipients can then interact cooperatively to get the message across. In stark contrast, two chimpanzees will never spontaneously carry something heavy together or make something together. Although apes understand that others behave intentionally according to their own goals, they do not form joint goals with others. They understand their own action from a first-person perspective and that of the partner from a third-person perspective, but they do not, like infants, have a bird’s-eye view of the entire interaction. They lack an understanding of roles, which makes them unable to switch roles in an activity (Tomasello, 2008).

Young human children, but not great apes, form joint goals and take on individual roles that constitute important parts in the collaborative success. The role is impartial and partner independent; it can be applied by anyone irrespective of personal characteristics or social relationships. They communicate with each other in an attempt to coordinate the collaboration, showing that they have a “bird’s-eye view” of the collaborative activity. They are able to change roles in ways that show that they are aware of individual perspectives. In the collaborative activity, it is the successful execution in itself that matters. While great apes operate according to an individual instrumental rationality, early humans were able to form the joint instrumental rationality of a pair (Tomasello, Reference Tomasello2016).

It is proposed that vocal language first came into existence as a support to existing collaborative activities that were regulated by gestural communication. Conventional languages (first signed and then vocal) built on gestural communication. One argument that supports the view that human gestural communication is the “building block” of collaborative problem solving is that great apes have much more advanced gestural communication than vocal communication. Vocalizations are genetically fixed and only display specific emotions, but gestures are learned and apes can use them in a relatively flexible way in different social contexts.

However, early humans were also able to develop more advanced types of gestural communication through pointing and pantomiming. Both these gestures can provide the recipient with useful information if it is considered trustworthy. Pointing is based on humans’ natural tendency to follow the gaze direction of others to external targets, and pantomiming is based on humans’ natural tendency to interpret the actions of others intentionally. To communicate nonlinguistically, humans use the pointing gesture to direct the visual attention of others, and they use iconic gestures (pantomiming) to direct the imagination of others. It is likely that these two unique gestures made mutualistic collaboration possible. They arose as ways of coordinating the immediate collaborative activity more efficiently, initially by requesting that the other do something – with compliance asserted because it helped both participants (Tomasello, 2008).

Pointing is arguably the best candidate of the first gestural act that transformed humans’ ability to collaborate in the immediate common ground of the mutual interaction. If we look at pointing in infants, there is evidence of a shared intentionality even before language acquisition begins (Figure 9.1). Infants are able to request things or share experiences and emotions with others. Humans are also the only primates that have highly visible eye direction, and indeed even human infants tend to follow the eye direction over the head direction of others, whereas great apes instead tend to follow the head direction. It suggests that eye contact must have had a more helpful function than a competitive function (Tomasello, 2008).

Figure 9.1 Smiling baby girl pointing at a unicorn figure.

photo Westend61/Getty Images ©

Furthermore, the communication in pointing and pantomiming is explicit, making it impossible to hide from the message without ignoring it. By letting the information “out in the open,” this strengthens the interpersonal feelings of joint commitment and the trust between the parties. For example, studies of young children show that they are committed to collaborative activity through to the end; they even stay to help their partner after they have received their part of the share. When they engage in a collaborative activity, they will also be more eager to help another child, in comparison with other children with whom they have not collaborated. When the payoffs are identical, children prefer to solve the task together with others versus doing it alone. Chimpanzees do not behave like this, which suggests that human altruism toward nonfriends originates from mutualistic collaboration. The powerful interdependency mechanisms made it possible for humans to extend their sense of sympathy beyond kin and friends to include their collaborative partners (Tomasello, Reference Tomasello2016).

Is this powerful interdependency present in verbal communication too? If we fast-forward in time and look at how top solvers in innovation teams solve problems together, there are several examples that illustrate the close intertwined collaboration between individuals. One solver states, “We arrived at the solution after throwing ideas back and forth. After one member came up with a really elaborate idea we built on that and grew it into the solution.” The statement suggests a process whereby ideas constantly move around in the group, being co-created and synthesized in new ways. It illustrates that verbal communication can also be a part of similar types of mutual collaboration.

9.2.2 Three Communicative Motives

Furthermore, Tomasello (2008: 87) proposes that the following three communicative motives were essential in the evolution of humans’ unique forms of collaborative activity:

• - Requesting help or information: “I want you to do something to help me.”

• - Informing others: “I want you to know something because I think it will help or interest you.”

• - Sharing feelings: “I want you to feel something so that we can share attitudes/feelings together.”

All these three motives are basic social motivations connected to helping and sharing, and they emerge early in a child’s development (Tomasello, 2008: 83).

9.2.3 The Joy of Collaboration

All three communicative motives assume that getting the message across will be mutual beneficiary for all parties involved. If a human communicator requests help (all other things being equal), the recipient will want to help, and if the communicator offers information, it is mutually assumed that the information is useful. Finally, if the communicator wants to share attitudes, they assume that the sharing will be interesting to the recipient. When the communicator overtly signals his intention to communicate, both parties try to ensure that the communicative act succeeds (Tomasello, 2008: 88–91).

A fascinating consequence of these communicative motives is that the collaborative activity is often in itself perceived as rewarding. In one interesting experiment, children between one and two years old were compared with juvenile human-raised chimpanzees on four collaborative tasks. Two tasks had a specific goal, and the two others were social games without a goal other than playing the collaborative game itself (e.g., the two partners using a trampoline to bounce a ball up in the air). The human adult collaborative partner was instructed to stop doing anything at some point to determine the commitment to the joint activity. The results showed that the chimpanzees were able to synchronize their behavior relatively skillfully in the instrumental tasks, but showed no interest in the social game. Most interestingly, when the human partner stopped participating, the chimpanzee never made a communicative attempt to reengage the partner even when they had previously been highly motivated in the instrumental tasks. They only participated in the tasks in an individualistic manner. In contrast, the human children collaborated in the social games and they even transformed the instrumental tasks into social games by placing the obtained reward back into the apparatus to start the activity again. It showed that the collaborative activity itself was more rewarding than the goal. When the adult stopped participating, the children actively sought to reengage the person, suggesting that they had a shared goal (Tomasello, 2008: 177–178).

If we look at modern examples of mutual collaboration, several of the top solvers are also motivated because they enjoy the teamwork. One solver states:

This solver underlines the joy of “building on the ideas of other contributors.” It illustrates how motivation is closely connected to the co-construction of new and unexpected thoughts. Another solver even expresses the paradox of enjoying the uncomfortable, “So it supplements your knowledge with other people’s knowledge. You work with people that are out of your comfort zone which I really enjoy because it pushes you to do more research into a challenge and push back against other people and really make innovative kinds of solutions.” The examples illustrate the positive feelings that emerge through the collective work in itself.

9.3.1 The Emergence of a Community of Learners

When did we as humans become a community of learners? Researchers claim that our evolutionary story as tool users can provide some degree of answer to how this happened. Stone toolmaking (knapping) is a complex skill integrating demands for planning, problem solving, and perceptual-motor coordination within a collaborative social context (Pargeter, Khreisheh, & Stout, 2019; Stout & Hecht, Reference Stout and Hecht2017). However, if we look at the first stone toolmaking which began approximately 2 million years ago by Homo erectus, this knapping only involved simple hammer techniques that required less demanding manual skills. Homo erectus had adjusted to the upright walking position and could use their hands in completely new ways, but stone tools were still used in a simple way for a long time. Therefore, it was not necessary to invest much time in skill learning (Pargeter et al., 2019; Stout & Hecht, Reference Stout and Hecht2017).

However, about 500,000 years ago, skill-intensive biface-thinning techniques emerged, providing powerful evidence of a new capacity of learning among early humans. Boxgrove, UK is one of the richest and the oldest handaxe sites in Europe (dated ca. 524–478 BC) and it provides evidence of a handaxe production with smaller, thinner, more regular and symmetrical forms (Figure 9.2). The cores and flakes have been carefully shaped, revealing the use of knapping techniques such as soft-hammer, percussion, and platform preparation that are comparable to how modern experimental knappers work (Pargeter et al., 2019; Stout & Hecht, Reference Stout and Hecht2017).

Figure 9.2 Regular flint handaxe from Boxgrove, West Sussex, England. From the Acheulian period. The typical tool is a general-purpose handaxe.

Credit: © The Trustees of the British Museum

Knapping is a practice which removes flakes from a stone core by using precise and controlled ballistic strikes with a handheld hammer (typically stone, bone, or antler). Only a small error in the strike will ruin the process. Expert knappers need to possess complex perceptual-motor skills, understanding the relationships between the force and location of the strike and how to position the core. Such a skill must not only be executed, but also observed and evaluated (Stout & Hecht, Reference Stout and Hecht2017).

Furthermore, training time is essential. Paleolithic foragers would have had to balance the costs and benefits of making and maintaining technology against the need to find food, avoid predators, and reproduce. Tool production time and foraging efficiency were obviously important factors to consider, but one study highlights instead the costs of skill acquisition as another important factor. In the experiment, modern participants were trained to make stone tools. The study shows that ∼200 hours of deliberate practice is required for refined handaxe production. The knapping learning curve follows a well-known “power-law of practice” that is common in both informal (sewing and cooking) and formal (biology and chess) learning. There were rapid initial increases in knapping skill followed by diminishing returns as performance approaches a local optimum. Although 200 hours in total might not appear to be a long time, other extra activities like the preparation of raw materials (e.g., spalling) and knapping tools (e.g., billet production) also had to be done (Pargeter et al., 2019).

Knapping is more of a flexible skill than one specific type of action. One needs to learn how to link effective means to appropriate goal-orientated action in many different ways depending on the specific task. In comparison, it is much easier to learn Oldowan knapping because it allows for more errors (Stout & Hecht, Reference Stout and Hecht2017). Learning the skill also requires extended investment in deliberative practice, directed toward improving performance through sustained effort and attention despite setbacks and frustrations. It requires discipline and self-control and is not necessarily enjoyable or rewarding in the short term. Learners must continuously check the actual incorrect outcome with the predicted outcome, and engage in a lengthy process of behavioral exploration to assess task constraints and refine skills. The largest neural and cognitive demands do not occur during the expert performance of the stone tool, but instead during the process of learning how to make stone tools. The working memory is taxed more heavily during the acquisition of expertise (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, Reference Ericsson, Krampe and Tesch-Römer1993; Pargeter et al., 2019; Stout & Hecht, Reference Stout and Hecht2017).

There is no doubt that making late Acheulean style handaxes requires both time and effort and a certain level of cognitive and affective learning. In addition, if the skills are only mastered by a small percentage of the group, they are vulnerable to loss. If the learning costs are high, it is less likely that others will acquire such skills. However, in a culture of teaching and learning, such a complex skill would more easily be maintained. The skills of making these tools suggest that hominid cognitive and technological complexity was going through a major transformation in this period. It suggests the presence of what could be the first advanced community of learners. Knapping skill acquisition involves the copying and high-fidelity production of stone tools, and probably required a community that encouraged collaboration, sharing of knowledge, and intergenerational reproduction of complex skills (Pargeter et al., 2019; Stout & Hecht, Reference Stout and Hecht2017).

If humans began to teach each other how to use these stone tools in this community, it is also likely that they developed the first human culture (Pargeter et al., 2019; Stout & Hecht, Reference Stout and Hecht2017). In general, explicit teaching is considered to be essential in cumulative cultural evolution. Teaching is present in all human societies, but it is not a common activity among chimpanzees or other nonhuman primates. Both children and adults are sensitive to teaching in their imitation of others. Teaching also involves a certain degree of altruism, in that the adult instructor needs to spend time and energy to ensure that a child acquires certain skills or knowledge. Children automatically trust adult teachers and are eager to change their behavior, in a way that chimpanzees apparently are not (Tennie et al., Reference Tennie, Call and Tomasello2009).

Archaeological evidence cannot demonstrate a particular form of teaching, but the knapping skill requires the use of complex techniques that even modern humans will struggle with if they do not receive explicit instruction. The tools provide evidence of a more complex learning and teaching practice that involved both individual practice and social support (Pargeter et al., 2019; Stout & Hecht, Reference Stout and Hecht2017). Instruction could have been given as intentional demonstration, communicative gestures, or some type of linguistic instruction. As in apprenticeship learning or coaching, skill acquisition practices involve a combination of social learning opportunities like observation, instruction, and motivated individual practice (Stout & Hecht, Reference Stout and Hecht2017).

If we compare humans with apes, an important difference is that humans are able to learn socially of the actual actions performed by others (process copying), not just the results produced on the environment (process copying). Humans are effective in copying others’ behavior and this begins early with the infant who imitates mom when observing her. Children do not only imitate to acquire more effective behavioral strategies in solving instrumental problems, but they also imitate for purely social reasons. In acquiring linguistic conventions, children are not only motivated by communicative efficacy, but by a desire to do it in the same way as others do. They conform to the group and imitate others simply because they want to be like them. The evolutionary basis is very likely identification with the group, motivating conformist cultural transmission and more faithful reproduction of behavior. In modern humans, one example is our tendency to follow fashions for no apparent instrumental reason (Tennie et al., Reference Tennie, Call and Tomasello2009).

In contrast, chimpanzees learn how or where a box works, but they are not attentive towards the actions or the behavioral techniques that are used. For example, when chimpanzees observe someone using a tool, they tend to focus on the effect being produced in the environment, but they pay little attention to the actual bodily actions of the tool user. Instead, they use their own behavioral strategies with the goal of producing the same environmental effect. Thus, they reconstruct the product rather than copy the process leading to it. They solve problems by themselves and are reluctant to adopt any new behavioral strategy if they already have one that works. Consequently, the cultural traditions of nonhuman primate species do not seem to accumulate modifications over time. Chimpanzees are in a way reinventing the same wheel again and again through emulation learning (Tennie et al., Reference Tennie, Call and Tomasello2009).

Humans are different since they can pay attention to the actual behavior or behavioral strategies of a demonstrator, and these processes must have been very important among the community of learners in Boxgrove. As part of a toolmaking practice, one type of observational learning would likely have aimed to copy the observed actions of others through a process of matching or “motor resonance.” This requires the ability to translate visual and auditory information of another’s actions to appropriate motor commands for one’s own bodily actions, probably also attempts to copy bodily postures and gestures. This skill learning requires a significant level of general intelligence since a number of subtasks must be organized into a coherent mental program (Stout & Hecht, Reference Stout and Hecht2017). This copying of processes also enables the further modification and improvement of artefacts and practices across generations (Tennie et al., Reference Tennie, Call and Tomasello2009).

9.3.2 Equal Participation

Obviously, there will be norms present in a human collaborative culture. Adults will expect that children behave in certain ways. Children do not only understand that something is done in a specific way, but also that this is how things “should be done.” At some point in children’s development, they expect that other persons ought to respond or help as requested, and they become offended if this does not happen. They begin following norms that regulate social behavior. In contrast, nonhuman primates show no signs of making normative judgements. Nonconforming behavior is not punished. In contrast, even three-year-old human children object if others do something the “wrong” way, and teach the offender how to do it the “right” way. This normative dimension does not only arise from explicit teaching, because when children observe adults, they will often think that everyone else should follow the adult behavior shown to them. This normative dimension of social learning strengthens the faithful transmission of knowledge skills across generations, reinforcing group identity and conformist transmission (Tennie et al., Reference Tennie, Call and Tomasello2009; Tomasello, 2008: 133).

An important question is how sanctions and social norms have evolved. Mutual expectations of helpfulness are not norms because they have no punitive force, but they are one step in that direction (Tomasello, 2008: 208). Tomasello (Reference Tomasello2016: 49–50) claims that the emergence of a sense of fairness and justice originates from the joint intentionality as effected by a collaborating dyad. To coordinate collaborative activities, humans evolved skills that enabled them to form joint goals. Both the self and the other were recognized as important in the collaborative enterprise, and this mutual respect led to the emergence of genuine morality. In this new cooperative rationality, it made sense to depend on a collaborative partner. Individuals who were able to act together dyadically as a joint agent “we” were also able to structure their individual roles and perspectives. Over time, they developed a common ground understanding of ideal roles such as in stone knapping teaching. This practice eventually evolved into socially shared normative standards that specified what either partner must do in their specific role of being a teacher and a learner (Tomasello, Reference Tomasello2016).

Reciprocity occurs widely in nature, but there is a difference between emotional (or attitudinal) reciprocity and calculated reciprocity. Mammals and especially primates, show emotional reciprocity because of their ability to form long-term emotion-based social relationships. Chimpanzees show positive affect toward those that help or share with them and with whom they engage in long-term social relationships. They can also feel sympathy for each other. Individuals form emotional bonds with those who help them and then they naturally help kin or “friends.” The origin of this type of reciprocity is probably based on offspring bonding to those who succor or protect them. However, this does not explain the mechanisms that lead individuals to form friendly social relationships with nonkin.

Calculated reciprocity is a very different type of reciprocity, building on an implicit contract or rule like “we each keep track of who has done what for whom and stop cooperating if we are giving more than we are getting.” If I help you on one occasion, you will help me on the next occasion, as far as we benefit of it in the long run. This classic tit-for-tat reciprocity requires that we obligate ourselves to a future course of action, which only humans are capable of. Except long-term social partners, there is very little evidence that great apes engage in any exchange of favors. For instance, one experimental study found that randomly paired chimpanzees did not preferentially help an individual that had just helped them over one that had not (Tomasello, Reference Tomasello2016).

This morality of fairness is confined to the human species. It is characterized by a sense of responsibility or obligation: “I do not only want to be fair to all concerned, but one ought to be fair to all concerned.” Collaborative partners will be accountable for their actions by invoking interpersonal judgements of responsibility, obligation, commitment, trust, respect, duty, blame, and guilt. Humans also show resentment or indignation against unfair others. In contrast, great apes do not appear to have a sense of fairness in dividing resources, and they exhibit no sign of so-called retributive justice. Nor was free riding any problem initially among early humans. The number of individuals available was the same as the number needed for foraging success, but at some point, they would not allow others to get the spoils.

The simplest way of sharing is to let participants get equal shares and nonparticipants get nothing, and indeed, young children have a very strong tendency to divide the spoils of a collaboration in this way. Studies even show that young human children, but not great apes, share the spoils of a collaborative effort even when one child is given the opportunity to take everything. Young children also modify their own cooperative behaviors depending on whether others are watching. One explanation can be that early humans’ collaborative activities took place in the context of partner choice in which potential partners evaluated others for their cooperativeness.

We also know that almost all contemporary hunter-gatherer groups are highly egalitarian. Dominant individuals are quickly overrun by a coalition of other individuals who are superior because of their group size. In a group hunt, the catch is almost always shared with others, not only in the immediate families, but more broadly in the social group at large. These social norms are usually very strict, and sanctions are used if they are not followed (Tomasello, Reference Tomasello2016).

In contrast, the chimpanzees act according to the principle of “first come, first served,” not equal sharing. The logic behind “tolerated theft” among chimpanzees is that if the possessor chooses to fight the harasser for the meat actively, he will likely lose more of the food to others nearby who will continue eating. The best strategy is to eat quickly all that he can, and allow others to take some meat to keep them happy. Hunters will obtain more meat than latecomers because they are the first at the carcass (Tomasello, 2008: 183). If there is a competition over food resources, collaboration will often fail. In one experiment, a pair of chimpanzees were presented with out-of-reach food that could only be obtained if they each pulled on one of the two ropes available simultaneously. First, when there were two piles of food, one in front of each participant, there was a moderate amount of synchronized pulling. However, when there was only one pile of food in the middle of the platform, making it difficult to share at the end, coordination fell apart almost completely. These findings demonstrate that chimpanzees are only able to synchronize activities when there is no quarreling over the food at the end. Although chimpanzees sometimes help humans, they do not help others if they themselves have a chance to obtain food (Tomasello, 2008: 183–184).

If we look at our human history, the arguably first type of formalized collaboration that emphasized equal participation were the collegial boards in ancient Athens. In the fourth century BC, the Athenians began to annually select some 700 magistrates. A lottery picked 600 hundred of them from the citizenry at large, while only 100 were elected in the Assembly. Most of these magistrates served on collegial boards, typically comprising ten persons with one representative from each tribe. All members were on equal footing, and there was no formal leader of the group. Decisions were based on discussions amongst the members, and if they disagreed there would be a vote and the majority decision bound all. These magisterial boards worked with public affairs according to the board’s constitutional charter, such as leading armies, maintaining oversight of public festivals, and disbursing welfare payments. Service on most teams was intense for its duration, but it was limited to a single year. This reduced the risk of harmful strategic behavior. Selection by lot guaranteed that team members would bring in a large variety of different personal perspectives. Together with a background culture that emphasized formal equality in respect to public speech and vocal dissent, these features would likely create conditions that allowed for equal participation through the inclusion of all group perspectives (Hansen, Reference Hansen1991: 237; Ober, Reference Ober2008).

Even today, public discussions in democracies are reliant on equal participation. Because these conversations invite to conflict and can be deeply uncomfortable, they require formal and informal rules of engagement. According to Schudson (Reference Schudson1997), what makes conversation democratic is not free or spontaneous expression, but equal access to the floor, equal participation in setting the ground rules for discussion, and rules designed to encourage focused talk. The insistence on equality and a social order that creates a certain level of publicness are core components in the democratic conversations.

The emphasis on equal participation and debate is also an important part of modern collaborative problem solving in virtual innovation teams. A top solver in a team explains:

The disagreement was solved by letting everyone make their case in order to convince the rest of the team. In the interview, this solver follows up and underlines the learning value of the process (“But I believe the amazing thing is that we learned a lot”) and the individual effort that members put into such type of work (“you try to come up with the best out of yourself.”)

If we look back at the magisterial boards, some historians claim that as many as ten individuals were selected just in case somebody turned out to be incompetent or unreliable. Although some individuals must have been incompetent, there are surprisingly few examples of complaints or people actually being dismissed. Moreover, when a magistrate was brought into court, the charge was usually bribery or corruption, not incompetence. According to the sources, the administration appeared to have worked satisfactorily in the lottocratic system with the support of a small group of clerical staff. Because the lottery was voluntary, candidates would usually be motivated to work in the administration, and the tasks would typically not require a high level of specialist skills (Hansen, Reference Hansen1991: 238–244).

The tasks in the board were based on the laws and decrees, and the magistrates were accountable for the funds they had used. Accountability procedures were strict, and all of them were assessed on reputation for character and conduct of life, rather than competence. Before leaving office, the magistrates also had to undergo a formal review (euthuna) of their work during the year. A special emphasis was put on the public funds (Hansen, Reference Hansen1991: 238–244). Gaining a good reputation as collaborators has probably been an important motivation early in evolution, too (Tomasello, 2008: 324–325).

Furthermore, even in virtual innovation teams, solvers highlight the value of being among “equals”:

The solver highlights the importance of receiving the same recognition for the group work. The description of being equals is contrasted to workplaces where there is a lack of a symmetrical relationship.

What appears important in all types of equal participation is being able to tackle disagreements and still acknowledge each other. The magisterial boards were organized to encompass these tensions, and so do modern innovation teams. A top solver illustrates this attitude when he is asked whether he is bothered by his ideas being critiqued:

In this type of collaborative problem solving, it is vital to accept critique and not think that this means that your opinions are unappreciated. If proposals in the group are refused without argumentation, it may create negative feelings. Interestingly, the emphasis in collaborative problem solving should be on the quality of the arguments and not the persons making them. It indicates the importance of having discussion rules that can control emotions and enable the best argument to win through a fair and open discussion.