In 1975 I was appointed Head of the Shipbuilding Policy Division at the Department of Industry. I was responsible for advice to Ministers on policy, and detailed monitoring of specific shipyards which had come within the ownership and control of the British Government. Government were by this stage responsible for Cammell Laird, Govan Shipbuilders and the Court Line companies such as Doxford and Sunderland Shipbuilders and Appledore. I was appointed at the end of 1976 to replace Graham Day as Chief Executive of what was then called the Organising Committee of British Shipbuilders, and in July 1977 I became Chief Executive and deputy Chairman.

The shipbuilding industry's labour relations were extremely poor and its management was extremely poor. Almost every aspect of the industry's structure and functions needed to be reviewed and dealt with. There was a need to drive into the industry at every level a whole range of reforms. That really was the initial task of British Shipbuilders at a very difficult time. The market had changed and British yards had simply failed to recognise the extent of these changes. They had clearly failed to recognise the massive impact of new competition on their share of that market. The new investment proposals which were developing in piecemeal fashion were coming far too late in the day, and were addressing only one particular part of a very comprehensive series of problems.

I have no doubt whatsoever that the great majority of companies outside the defence field were likely to collapse at or around the time of public ownership, or very shortly afterwards, and indeed a very significant number of them were gravely financially embarrassed. I do not think it is true that the shipbuilding industry opposed the Bill in reality. The great majority of the companies desperately wanted to be brought into public ownership, and were deeply concerned at the delays in case they would collapse beforehand. The proof of the matter was that this was a perception overseas, and the Government had to introduce, before public ownership, a Performance Bond Scheme, which it underwrote. This meant that the British Government was providing a performance guarantee with relation to orders placed with the yards in case they collapsed before the ships were delivered.