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3 - Naturalism defended (386e–390e)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2011

Francesco Ademollo
Affiliation:
Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Firenze
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Summary

In chapter 2 I analysed Socrates' first reactions to Hermogenes' thesis and argued that down to 386d2, where the rejection of Protagoras' relativist doctrine is accomplished, Socrates displays no hostile attitude towards conventionalism. In the sequel, however, what might have seemed just an inquiry into Hermogenes' attitude to Protagoras turns out to have been also, at the same time, the first step of a long and complex defence of naturalism and attack on conventionalism, which will end in 390de with the conclusion that Cratylus is right and Hermogenes is wrong. Our next task is to explore the structure, content and purpose of the arguments which Socrates advances here.

FIRST ARGUMENT: THE NATURALNESS OF ACTIONS (386E–387D)

The naturalness of actions. Cutting and burning (386e–387b)

Socrates' next and crucial step is to argue that actions have an objective nature:

so. Could it then be the case that the objects themselves [αὐτά] have such a nature, while the actions belonging to them [αἱ δὲ πράξεις αὐτῶν] aren't in the same condition? Or aren't these too, I say actions, one kind of beings [ἕν τι εἶδος τῶν ὄντων]?

he. Of course they are too.

so. Therefore actions too are performed according to their nature, not according to our judgement [κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἄρα φύσιν καὶ αἱ πράξεις πράττονται, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν δόξαν].

(386e6–387a2)

Essentially, I take Socrates to be simply arguing, in accordance with the conclusion of Protagoras' refutation (386de), that actions have an objective nature because everything does.

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Chapter
Information
The Cratylus of Plato
A Commentary
, pp. 95 - 145
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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