Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Regime survival and control of the post-colonial state
- 2 Mobilization for control of the state in Guyana and Trinidad
- 3 Maintaining control of the state: strategies for regime survival in Guyana and Trinidad
- 4 Elite support and control of the state: race, ideology,and clientelism
- 5 Regime survival and state control of the economy
- 6 The political and economic costs of regime survival
- 7 Collective needs versus the demands of powerful actors in less developed countries
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- Other books in the series
7 - Collective needs versus the demands of powerful actors in less developed countries
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Regime survival and control of the post-colonial state
- 2 Mobilization for control of the state in Guyana and Trinidad
- 3 Maintaining control of the state: strategies for regime survival in Guyana and Trinidad
- 4 Elite support and control of the state: race, ideology,and clientelism
- 5 Regime survival and state control of the economy
- 6 The political and economic costs of regime survival
- 7 Collective needs versus the demands of powerful actors in less developed countries
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- Other books in the series
Summary
The approach that has been employed in the foregoing analysis of Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago is similar to what Samuel P. Huntington (1971: 319–21) calls the “crisis” model of political change. It emphasizes the choices made by a political leadership in the quest to gain and maintain control of the state. It subscribes to the notion, argued by Rustow (1970: 337–63), that the conditions for conquest of power are different from those necessary to ensure political tenure.
Political leaders in LDCs can come to power by directly representing the interests of powerful and strategic actors who are dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs and/or by making alliances with them. In this manner, they can assure themselves of access to resources for use against the political incumbents. These resources vary and can include sheer numbers, financial power, economic control, coercive resources, propaganda, and the like. They can be located in both the domestic and international environments.
To remain in power, the incumbent regime must seek to accommodate dissident actors, either by giving them direct control of political decision-making or by formulating policy to meet their demands, or it must seek to neutralize them. The object of neutralization is to insulate the political, social, and economic systems from the effects of negative and destabilizing actions or to insulate the regime itself from the consequences of such actions.
International actors
International actors can pose the most formidable threat to the stability of regimes in LDCs.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Costs of Regime SurvivalRacial Mobilization, Elite Domination and Control of the State in Guyana and Trinidad, pp. 200 - 215Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1989