The approach taken in this book has been “iterative” rather than “causal” in its view of transborder duties; that is to say, it has adopted a version of a moral generalization principle in getting from what we owe to co–citizens to what we owe to those outside. It thus dissents from several important views that take as their starting–point the facts of global interaction, deriving ideas about what we owe to outsiders from the indisputable reality of globalization. In places, in fact, this dissent has been explicit, the discussion offering alternatives to interactionist proposals offered by Onora O'Neill and James Bohman, for example. This approach may seem to invite the charge of ignoring what should not be ignored. The charge is particularly likely to be pressed in connection with the idea of risk that played an important role in justifying compatriot preference, for part of the indisputable reality of an interdependent world is that what we do imposes severe risks not only on co–citizens but on distant strangers. An attempt was made to identify kinds of risk that apply to co–citizens distinctively: but all the same, a risk is a risk, and even if it is of another kind its imposition can hardly be ignored. But this approach does not do so. The iterative model tells us that participants in one social project have duties to aid, and not to impede, the social projects of others.