Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction: The Costs of Corruption
- Part I Corruption as an Economic Problem
- Part II Corruption as a Cultural Problem
- Part III Corruption as a Political Problem
- Part IV Achieving Reform
- 10 The Role of the International Community
- 11 Domestic Conditions for Reform
- 12 Conclusions
- References
- Name Index
- Subject Index
12 - Conclusions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction: The Costs of Corruption
- Part I Corruption as an Economic Problem
- Part II Corruption as a Cultural Problem
- Part III Corruption as a Political Problem
- Part IV Achieving Reform
- 10 The Role of the International Community
- 11 Domestic Conditions for Reform
- 12 Conclusions
- References
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Summary
Self-interest and the public interest frequently conflict. In a corrupt relationship both the briber and the recipient are better off, but the transaction violates government policy. A criterion other than willingness to pay is supposed to prevail. Sometimes corrupt public officials claim that bribes have not influenced their behavior. They are simply “gifts of good will.” Private individuals and firms may, nevertheless, believe that such gifts are, in fact, a requirement of good service up and down the government hierarchy. Even those who pay to receive something they ought to obtain for free believe that bribery is better than the alternative presented by the corrupt official. They may believe that politicians and judges will be biased against them if no money or favors have changed hands. The systemic effect of permitting such payoffs is damaging. Those with discretion will be tempted to create a large number of vaguely specified rules that create more chances for payoffs. Those who have not paid in the past may be tempted to pay in the future because it appears to be the norm.
Although individual payoffs may seem to further efficiency and even fairness, systemic corruption will seldom do so. In a repressive state, where many policies are harmful to all except a favored elite, corruption may be a survival strategy. Toleration of this practice, however, may just permit an illegitimate and inefficient system to persist. Corruption scandals can then be a sign of a country's growing political maturity.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Corruption and GovernmentCauses, Consequences, and Reform, pp. 225 - 229Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1999