Internalizing Cooperative Norms in Group-Structured Populations

doi:10.1017/9781108671187.004

2 - Internalizing Cooperative Norms in Group-Structured Populations

from Part I - Broad Insights from Political Science to Molecular Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 February 2021

Erol Akçay and

Jeremy Van Cleve

Edited by

Walter Wilczynski and

Sarah F. Brosnan

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Walter Wilczynski: Affiliation:
Georgia State University
Sarah F. Brosnan: Affiliation:
Georgia State University

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Summary

The success of humans in spreading through all of Earth’s ecosystems and transforming them at planetary scale is directly dependent on our capacity to cooperate in large groups and self-organize in complex social structures that sustain such cooperation. One of the main components of such large-scale cooperation is the human capacity and propensity for inventing and following social norms (Ostrom, 2000; Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018). Social norms influence almost all aspects of human behavior, providing a “grammar of society” (Bicchieri, 2005, 2010) that constrains and enables different kinds of individual behaviors, coordinates collective behavior, and sustains cooperation in the face of conflicts of interests.

Type: Chapter
Information: Cooperation and Conflict
The Interaction of Opposites in Shaping Social Behavior
, pp. 26 - 44

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108671187.004 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2021

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