Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 (Re)discovering the continent
- Part I COIL's building blocks: theory and data
- Part II Flexibility provisions in the design of international law
- Part III Centralization, scope, and control provisions in the design of international law
- 7 Dispute resolution provisions
- 8 Punishment provisions
- 9 Monitoring provisions
- 10 Asymmetric design rules, voting, and power
- 11 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 List of agreements in COIL sample
- Appendix 2 Coding rules
- Appendix 3 Selection issues in international cooperation data sets
- References
- Index
9 - Monitoring provisions
from Part III - Centralization, scope, and control provisions in the design of international law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2016
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 (Re)discovering the continent
- Part I COIL's building blocks: theory and data
- Part II Flexibility provisions in the design of international law
- Part III Centralization, scope, and control provisions in the design of international law
- 7 Dispute resolution provisions
- 8 Punishment provisions
- 9 Monitoring provisions
- 10 Asymmetric design rules, voting, and power
- 11 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 List of agreements in COIL sample
- Appendix 2 Coding rules
- Appendix 3 Selection issues in international cooperation data sets
- References
- Index
Summary
For the first time in 15 years, U.S. officials have lost their ability to inspect Russian long-range nuclear bases, where they had become accustomed to peering into missile silos, counting warheads and whipping out tape measures to size up rockets …
“The problem of the breakdown of our verification, which lapsed December 5 [2009], is very serious and impacts our national security,” Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), one of the chamber's top nuclear experts, said in a recent hearing …
“It was the holy grail to get on-site inspections, boots on the ground in the Soviet Union,” said Franklin Miller, who worked in arms control for more than two decades, ending up as special assistant to President George W. Bush.
Monitoring systems are designed to inform states whether their partners in cooperation are complying with their obligations or not. Under many conditions, many of which are elaborated by game-theoretic models of cooperation such as the repeated prisoners’ dilemma game (e.g., Axelrod 1984), information about compliance is crucial, and losing that information is indeed like losing the “holy grail.” Thus it is not surprising that mechanisms identifying compliance were once thought to be the raison d’être of international institutions.
In reality, the incidence of monitoring provisions is neither trivial nor universal; nor, when provisions exist, do they exhibit the same form. Consider the following:
• 60 percent of the agreements in the COIL random sample call for the creation of monitoring arrangements; 40 percent do not.
• Not a single monetary agreement in the COIL samples calls for the creation of a system of compliance monitoring.
• An astonishingly high majority (89 percent) of disarmament agreements call for a system of monitoring.
• 63 percent of human rights agreements delegate monitoring to a pre-existing IGO, but only 10 percent of economics agreements do.
This chapter explains both the incidence and form of monitoring systems. In a nutshell, agreements are particularly likely to call for a system to collect and disseminate information when there is substantial Uncertainty about the Behavior of other states, thereby corroborating Keohane's classic argument about the role of international institutions in the provision and dissemination of information.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Continent of International LawExplaining Agreement Design, pp. 261 - 292Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016