Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 What is metaphysics?
- Chapter 2 In defence of Aristotelian metaphysics
- Chapter 3 Existence and quantification reconsidered
- Chapter 4 Identity, quantification, and number
- Chapter 5 Ontological categories
- Chapter 6 Are any kinds ontologically fundamental?
- Chapter 7 Are four categories two too many?
- Chapter 8 Four categories – and more
- Chapter 9 Neo-Aristotelianism and substance
- Chapter 10 Developmental potential
- Chapter 11 The origin of life and the definition of life
- Chapter 12 Essence, necessity, and explanation
- Chapter 13 No potency without actuality: the case of graph theory
- Chapter 14 A neo-Aristotelian substance ontology: neither relational nor constituent
- References
- Index
Chapter 6 - Are any kinds ontologically fundamental?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 What is metaphysics?
- Chapter 2 In defence of Aristotelian metaphysics
- Chapter 3 Existence and quantification reconsidered
- Chapter 4 Identity, quantification, and number
- Chapter 5 Ontological categories
- Chapter 6 Are any kinds ontologically fundamental?
- Chapter 7 Are four categories two too many?
- Chapter 8 Four categories – and more
- Chapter 9 Neo-Aristotelianism and substance
- Chapter 10 Developmental potential
- Chapter 11 The origin of life and the definition of life
- Chapter 12 Essence, necessity, and explanation
- Chapter 13 No potency without actuality: the case of graph theory
- Chapter 14 A neo-Aristotelian substance ontology: neither relational nor constituent
- References
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Are any natural kinds ontologically fundamental? This question may be put in a different way: do we need a category of kinds? We use kind terms in a name-like way, and we can count kinds (‘there are 92 naturally occurring chemical elements’). But if we look at the fundamental constituents of the states-of-affairs that involve kinds, do we find entities that are the natural kinds?
Whereas David Armstrong takes a reductive attitude towards natural kinds, E. J. Lowe regards kinds as ontologically fundamental. His ontology requires four categories, one of which is reserved for the natural kinds – substantial universals as he calls them.
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- Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics , pp. 94 - 104Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011
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