Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- I INTRODUCTION
- II PREFERENCE REVERSALS
- III PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF PREFERENCE REVERSALS
- IV EVIDENCE FOR PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION
- V THEORIES OF PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION
- VI AFFECT AND REASON
- VII MISWANTING
- 27 New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption
- 28 Distinction Bias: Misprediction and Mischoice Due to Joint Evaluation
- 29 Lay Rationalism and Inconsistency Between Predicted Experience and Decision
- 30 Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of Future Affective States
- VIII CONTINGENT VALUATION
- IX PREFERENCE MANAGEMENT
- References
- Index
30 - Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of Future Affective States
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- I INTRODUCTION
- II PREFERENCE REVERSALS
- III PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF PREFERENCE REVERSALS
- IV EVIDENCE FOR PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION
- V THEORIES OF PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION
- VI AFFECT AND REASON
- VII MISWANTING
- 27 New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption
- 28 Distinction Bias: Misprediction and Mischoice Due to Joint Evaluation
- 29 Lay Rationalism and Inconsistency Between Predicted Experience and Decision
- 30 Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of Future Affective States
- VIII CONTINGENT VALUATION
- IX PREFERENCE MANAGEMENT
- References
- Index
Summary
“It would not be better if things happened to men just as they want.”
Heraclitus, Fragments (500 b.c.)INTRODUCTION
Like and want are among the first things children learn to say, and once they learn to say them, they never stop. Liking has to do with how a thing makes us feel, and wanting is, simply enough, a prediction of liking. When we say, “I like this doughnut,” we are letting others know that the doughnut currently under consumption is making us feel a bit better than before. When we say, “I want a doughnut,” we are making an abbreviated statement whose extended translation is something like, “Right now I'm not feeling quite as good as I might be, and I think fried dough will fix that.” Statements about wanting tend to be statements about those things that we believe will influence our sense of well-being, satisfaction, happiness, and contentment. Hence, when we say we want something, we are more or less promising that we will like it when we get it.
But promises are easier to make than to keep, and sometimes we get what we say we want and feel entirely unhappy about it. We order a cheeseburger only to find that it looks and smells precisely as cheeseburgers always look and smell, and despite that fact, we have absolutely no interest in eating it.
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- The Construction of Preference , pp. 550 - 564Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006
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