The inspiration for this book is the policy of “strategic ambiguity,” which is the United States’ strategy for addressing the dispute between China and Taiwan. I first became aware of the politics of the Taiwan Strait when I lived in Taiwan 20 years ago. I have a vivid memory of visiting Taiwan’s west coast and looking out over the Taiwan Strait from the vantage point of an empty pillbox, which was constructed decades before in anticipation of an attack by Chinese Communist soldiers. Taiwan has many such reminders of its tense relationship with mainland China, a relationship I did not fully appreciate or understand when I was only 19 years old.

A friend from Taiwan, who did his military service on the island of Quemoy, left an indelible impression on me. He was a proud descendant of the Sun family – of Sun Yatsen – and spoke longingly about Taiwan being reunited with China; yet, he served as a soldier charged with the responsibility of defending a tiny island from mainland China. I was struck by the strength of his convictions and the peculiarity of the dispute separating him from his ancestral home. Equally remarkable to me was the symbolic value of the tiny and militarily useless island of Quemoy. For a period of time in the 1950s, the world, including millions of Americans who had no idea what or where Quemoy was, feared there might be a war, perhaps involving nuclear weapons, over a piece of land smaller than Staten Island that lay just a few kilometers off of China’s coast. In researching this book, I have had the opportunity to revisit and explore in greater depth these early impressions. More important, I have learned that embedded in the narrow politics of the Taiwan Strait are valuable general lessons for the study of international politics.