Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Notes on contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Gag rules or the politics of omission
- 3 Democracy as a contingent outcome of conflicts
- 3 Consequences of constitutional choice: reflections on Tocqueville
- 4 Liberal constitutionalism and its critics: Carl Schmitt and Max Weber
- 5 Democracy and the rule of law: some historical experiences of contradictions in the striving for good government
- 6 Neo-federalism?
- 7 Precommitment and the paradox of democracy
- 8 American constitutionalism and the paradox of private property
- 9 From liberal constitutionalism to corporate pluralism: the conflict over the enabling acts in Norway after the Second World War and the subsequent constitutional development
- 10 Arguments for constitutional choice: reflections on the transition to socialism
- 11 Constitutions and democracies: an epilogue
- Index
9 - From liberal constitutionalism to corporate pluralism: the conflict over the enabling acts in Norway after the Second World War and the subsequent constitutional development
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Notes on contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Gag rules or the politics of omission
- 3 Democracy as a contingent outcome of conflicts
- 3 Consequences of constitutional choice: reflections on Tocqueville
- 4 Liberal constitutionalism and its critics: Carl Schmitt and Max Weber
- 5 Democracy and the rule of law: some historical experiences of contradictions in the striving for good government
- 6 Neo-federalism?
- 7 Precommitment and the paradox of democracy
- 8 American constitutionalism and the paradox of private property
- 9 From liberal constitutionalism to corporate pluralism: the conflict over the enabling acts in Norway after the Second World War and the subsequent constitutional development
- 10 Arguments for constitutional choice: reflections on the transition to socialism
- 11 Constitutions and democracies: an epilogue
- Index
Summary
In 1945 all the political parties represented in the Storting (the Norwegian parliament) put up a joint program for the reconstruction period. The only party not to sign the program was the Communist Party. The setting up of a joint program has led to the conclusion that there was an exceptionally high degree of political consensus in Norway in the late forties. There are, however, some factors which complicate the picture. On the one hand it is correct that there was a general reaction against the old party feuds and a general feeling of unity in the nation. On the other hand there was what may be seen as conflict to win leadership over the unified nation. Thus we find a curious blend of conflict and unity. While the joint program expressed unity, the conflict over laws regulating prices and production revealed deep ideological divisions. Political strife concerning these laws started in the Norwegian War Cabinet in London in 1944 and continued up to 1953. We shall return to the “solution” found in that year.
The laws mentioned above were enabling acts by which the Storting gave broad discretionary powers to the government and to the public administration for intervention in economic life. There was general agreement that the administration should have discretionary powers. The conflict concentrated on the extent of these powers. In the early phase of the debate, however, it appeared that constitutional questions were not significant issues for some participants.
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- Constitutionalism and Democracy , pp. 275 - 302Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1988