Since the 1970s, early modern mobility has been the subject of numerous works that have questioned the so-called ‘mobility transition.’ This paradigm, proposed by geographers such as Wilbur Zelinsky, identifies a divide between a supposedly static and immobile early modern society and a highly mobile, post-nineteenth-century one. According to this theory, the ‘modernization’ of the nineteenth century led to a dramatic change in mobility patterns, turning migration into a mass phenomenon. Zelinsky’s idea has been amply debated and, indeed, contested by historians. The image of static pre-modern societies has been convincingly shown to be far from the truth. Even discounting those who are highly mobile by definition, such as refugees, in the early modern world most people’s existence was marked by one form of mobility or another.

Zelinsky’s critics have had a much harder time addressing the second part of his paradigm. Although the link with ‘modernization’ has been successfully criticized, the dramatic rise in migration rates, especially from the mid-nineteenth century, is not in question. In fact, Leo Lucassen’s recent attempt at quantifying early modern migration, while reaffirming the highly mobile nature of early modern Europe, has confirmed that there was indeed a significant increase in migration rates in the nineteenth century. The construction of railways and the greater efficiency of seaborne commerce – involving the use of the steam engine and the emergence of ocean liners – boosted the speed, regularity, and predictability of transportation; lowered costs and risks; and in so doing facilitated and increased movement, especially across great distances.