Biblical texts warn us that no one can serve two gods. Lawyers, no doubt, have occasionally done so; and comparative lawyers must, surely, have a dispensation to do so regularly. For the raison d'être of the latter is to describe and compare different systems without fear or favour, largely for the sake of the advantages and the insights that flow from any comparative exercise. We have thus tried to present in a comparative juxtaposition three major legal systems of the world and have addressed our text to two readerships which are often described as being very different – practitioners (including judges) and academics. We have done this for two reasons.

Many have written about the respective tasks of these two kinds of lawyers; and in England those who have done so have stressed how different they are. There is, of course, some truth in these assertions; but in our view these differences have also been exaggerated – at any rate whenever one is trying to make the one group work closely with the other, as we feel they must. For in such circumstances academics must try to present their theories in any way that makes them palatable to practitioners; if they do not, their dish (for which read ideas) will not be savoured.

To the extent that the book describes in modest detail what can be claimed in the event of personal (not fatal) injuries in the three systems compared, it tries to serve the first constituency.