Book contents
- Comparative Constitutional Design
- Comparative Constitutional Design
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Design Processes
- Part II How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions
- Part III Issues in Institutional Design
- 8 Constitutional Amendment Rules
- 9 Collective-Action Federalism
- 10 Personal Laws and Equality
- 11 Constitutional Adjudication, Italian Style
- 12 Tyrannophobia
- 13 Do Executive Term Limits Cause Constitutional Crises?
- Index
8 - Constitutional Amendment Rules
The Denominator Problem
from Part III - Issues in Institutional Design
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
Edited by
Book contents
- Comparative Constitutional Design
- Comparative Constitutional Design
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Design Processes
- Part II How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions
- Part III Issues in Institutional Design
- 8 Constitutional Amendment Rules
- 9 Collective-Action Federalism
- 10 Personal Laws and Equality
- 11 Constitutional Adjudication, Italian Style
- 12 Tyrannophobia
- 13 Do Executive Term Limits Cause Constitutional Crises?
- Index
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- Comparative Constitutional Design , pp. 195 - 218Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012
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- Cited by