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5 - The Machinery of Intergovernmental Relations: An Institutional Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Martin Painter
Affiliation:
University of Sydney
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Summary

Australia inherited the Westminster parliamentary system, with its strong executive tradition; the result is that intergovernmental relations are dominated by the executive arms of government. As well as the longstanding annual Premiers' Conferences, specific-purpose ministerial councils—for example a meeting of ministers of agriculture—and supporting officials' committees and working parties provide regular fora for consultation. A large number of ad hoc or standing administrative groups and other arrangements add to the complexity (ACIR 1984). These bodies are the media for information exchange and may deliberate on and oversee specific financial and program relations. Some of these relations are conducted under the auspices of formal intergovernmental agreements to enable joint action, in a number of cases being accompanied by schemes of uniform legislation and in some cases implemented through intergovernmental administrative arrangements such as a joint board or commission. Another set of relationships, more or less formalised, are those associated with Commonwealth specialpurpose payments for specific programs. All of this machinery is sustained by day-to-day contacts between individual officials, ‘so informal as to be beyond enumeration’ (Warhurst 1987, 261).

The increase in the number and scope of all types of intergovernmental arrangements has accelerated in recent years (Wettenhall 1985; ACIR 1986a; COAG 1993; JCPA 1995). John Warhurst (1983; 1987) has traced the progression in management forms from sectoral linkages between departments to more coherent, centrally coordinated relationships constructed and overseen by intergovernmental managers.

Type
Chapter
Information
Collaborative Federalism
Economic Reform in Australia in the 1990s
, pp. 92 - 120
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

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