Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-g7gxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-05T01:46:27.398Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Out of the Mouths of Autistics: Subjective Report and Its Role in Cognitive Theorizing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2010

Victoria McGeer
Affiliation:
Research Associate, Center for Human Values, Princeton
Andrew Brook
Affiliation:
Carleton University, Ottawa
Kathleen Akins
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University, British Columbia
Get access

Summary

The theoretical work that emerges from a study on the work of memory, learning, and other higher functions, such as consciousness, is this: if the psychological (functional) taxonomy is ill-defined, then the search for neural substrates for those functions will be correspondingly ill-defined. There are, certainly, remarkable data, found at all levels in psychology and neuroscience, but precisely how to interpret the data in terms of a theory of neurobiological capacities, representations and processes is yet to be discovered.

– Patricia Churchland, Neurophilosophy

My primary concern in this chapter is with subjective report, and in particular, first-person reports of abnormal sensory and/or perceptual experiences. This topic raises interesting questions at two distinct levels: First, there are philosophical questions about the nature of subjective experience, subjective awareness of experience, and subjects' capacity to articulate what they are experiencing. Secondly, there are questions about how philosophical theories of such matters interact with empirical theories of – and research into – abnormal neurocognitive conditions. To focus my discussion of these questions, I will be considering, in particular, the phenomenon of subjective report in high-functioning individuals with autism.

Understanding Autism: Some Methodological and Substantive Concerns

Autism presents a highly complex challenge for researchers trying to negotiate between neurological and cognitive levels of theorizing. As with other neurodevelopmental disorders, such research involves working along two dimensions at once. As T. W. Robbins explains:

The challenge to research into childhood autism lies in relating what appears to be a set of apparently somewhat independent symptoms … to corresponding deficits in brain systems.[…]

Type
Chapter
Information
Cognition and the Brain
The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement
, pp. 98 - 128
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Armstrong, D. (1968, 1993). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London, RoutledgeGoogle Scholar
Bar-On, D. (2000). Speaking my mind. Philosophical Topics 28(2): 1–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bar-On, D., and Long, D. C. (2001). Avowals and first-person privilege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(2): 311–335CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron-Cohen, S. (1996). Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. Cambridge, MA, MIT PressGoogle Scholar
Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H., and Cohen, D. J., Eds. (1993). Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism. Oxford, Oxford University PressGoogle Scholar
Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H., and Cohen, D. J., Eds. (2000). Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience. Oxford, Oxford University PressGoogle Scholar
Brown, R., Hobson, R. P., and Lee, A. (1997). Are there ‘autistic-like’ features in congenitally blind children? Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 38(6): 693–703CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Churchland, P. S., V. S. Ramachandran, and T. J. Sejnowski (1994). A critique of pure vision. In Koch, C. and Davis, J. (Eds.), Large Scale Neuronal Theories of the Brain. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press: 23–60Google Scholar
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston, MA, Little, Brown and CompanyGoogle Scholar
Dennett, D. C. (1992). ‘Filling in’ versus finding out: A ubiquitous confusion in cognitive science. In Pick, H. L., Broek, P., and Knill, D. C. (Eds.), Cognition: Conceptual and Methodological Issues. Washington, DC, American Psychological Association: 33–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frith, U. (1989). Autism: Explaining the Enigma. Oxford, BlackwellGoogle Scholar
Frith, U., Ed. (1991). Asperger and his Syndrome. Cambridge, Cambridge University PressCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frith, U., and Happé, F. (1994). Autism: Beyond ‘theory of mind’. Cognition 50: 115–132CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frith, U., and Happé, F. (1999). Theory of mind and self-consciousness: What is it like to be autistic? Mind and Language 14(1): 1–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gerland, G. (1997). A Real Person: Life on the Outside. London, Souvenir PressGoogle Scholar
Gerrans, P., and McGeer, V. (2003). Theory of Mind in Autism and Schizophrenia. Brighton and New York, Psychology PressGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. I. (1997). Science, publicity and consciousness. Philosophy of Science 64: 525–545CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. I. (2000). Can science know when you're conscious? Epistemological foundations of cognitive research. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(5): 3–22Google Scholar
Green, D., Baird, G., Barnett, A. L., Henderson, L., Huber, J., and Henderson, S. E. (2002). The severity and nature of motor impairment in Asperger's syndrome: A comparison with Specific Developmental Disorder of Motor Function. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines 43(5): 655–668CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Happé, F. (1996). Studying weak central coherence at low levels: Children with autism do not succumb to visual illusions: A research note. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 37(7): 873–877CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Happé, F. (2000). Parts and wholes, meanings and minds: Central coherence and its relation to theory of mind. In Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H., and Cohen, D. J. (Eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 203–221Google Scholar
Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. In Tomberlin, J. (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives. Atascadero, CA, Ridgeview 4: 31–52Google Scholar
Hobson, R. P. (1993). Understanding persons: The role of affect. In Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H., and Cohen, D. J. (Eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 204–227Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1975). Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Oxford, Clarendon PressCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jolliffe, T., Lansdown, R., and Robinson, C. (1992). Autism: A personal account. Communication 26(3): 12–19Google Scholar
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1998). Development itself is the key to understanding developmental disorders. Trends in Cognitive Science 2(10): 389–398CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Klin, A., Volkmar, F. R., and Sparrow, S. S., Eds. (2000). Asperger Syndrome. New Haven, CT, Yale University Medical CenterGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mayes, S. D., and Calhoun, S. L. (2001). Non-significance of early speech delay in children with autism and normal intelligence and implications for DSM-IV Asperger's disorder. Autism 5(1): 81–94CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mayes, S. D., Calhoun, S. L., and Crites, D. L. (2001). Does DSM-IV Asperger's disorder exist? Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology 29(3): 263–271CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
McGeer, V. (2001). Psycho-practice, psycho-theory and the contrastive case of autism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(5–7): 109–132Google Scholar
McGeer, V. (in preparation). Mind in Time: The Developmental Character of Human Intentionality, under contract to MIT Press
Ozonoff, S., South, M., and Miller, J. N. (2000). DSM-IV-defined Asperger syndrome: Cognitive, behavioral and early history differentiation from high-functioning autism. Autism 4(1): 29–46Google Scholar
Peterson, C. C., Peterson, J. C., and Webb, J. (2000). Factors influencing the development of a theory of mind in blind children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology18(3): 431–447Google Scholar
Peterson, C. C., and Siegal, M. (1998). Changing focus on the representational mind: Concepts of false photos, false drawings and false beliefs in deaf, autistic and normal children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology 16: 301–320CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raffman, D. (1999). What autism may tell us about self-awareness: A commentary on Frith and Happé. Mind and Language 14(1): 23–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ramachandran, V. S., and Hubbard, E. M. (2001a). Psychophysical investigations into the neural basis of synaesthesia. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, B 268: 979–983CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ramachandran, V. S., and Hubbard, E. M. (2001b). Synaesthesia: A window into perception, thought and language. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(12): 3–34Google Scholar
Rensink, R. A. (2000). The dynamic representation of scenes. Visual Cognition 7(1–3): 17–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Robbins, T. W. (1997). Integrating the neurological and neuropsychological dimensions of autism. In Russell, J. (Ed.), Autism as an Executive Disorder. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 21–53Google Scholar
Shoemaker, S. (1996). The First Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge, Cambridge University PressCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tager-Flusberg, H., Ed. (1999). Neurodevelopmental Disorders. Boston, MA, MIT Press/BradfordGoogle Scholar
Willey, L. H. (1999). Pretending to Be Normal: Living with Asperger Syndrome. London, Jessica Kingsley PublishersGoogle Scholar
Williams, D. (1999). Autism and Sensing: The Unlost Instinct. London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×