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Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2010

By
Andrew Brook  and
Pete Mandik
Edited by
Andrew Brook  and
Kathleen Akins
Andrew Brook
Affiliation:
Professor of Philosophy and Director, Institute of Cognitive Science, Carleton University
Pete Mandik
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Coordinator, Cognitive Science Lab, William Paterson University
Andrew Brook
Affiliation:
Carleton University, Ottawa
Kathleen Akins
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University, British Columbia
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Summary

A small movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began 20–25 years ago and has been gaining momentum ever since. The central thought behind it is that certain basic questions about human cognition, questions that have been studied in many cases for millennia, will be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of what contemporary neuroscience is teaching us about how the human brain processes information.

The evidence for this proposition is now overwhelming. The philosophical problem of perception has been transformed by new knowledge about the vision systems in the brain. Our understanding of memory has been deepened by knowing that two quite different systems in the brain are involved in short- and long-term memory. Knowing something about how language is implemented in the brain has transformed our understanding of the structure of language, especially the structure of many breakdowns in language. And so on. On the other hand, a great deal is still unclear about the implications of this new knowledge of the brain. Are cognitive functions localized in the brain in the way assumed by most recent work on brain imaging? Does it even make sense to think of cognitive activity being localized in such a way? Does knowing about the areas active in the brain when we are conscious of something hold any promise for helping with long-standing puzzles about the nature and role of consciousness? And so on.

Type
Chapter
Information
Cognition and the Brain
The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement
 , pp. 1 - 24
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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  • Introduction
    • By Andrew Brook, Professor of Philosophy and Director, Institute of Cognitive Science, Carleton University, Pete Mandik, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Coordinator, Cognitive Science Lab, William Paterson University
  • Edited by Andrew Brook, Carleton University, Ottawa, Kathleen Akins, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia
  • Book: Cognition and the Brain
  • Online publication: 02 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610608.001
Available formats
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Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Introduction
    • By Andrew Brook, Professor of Philosophy and Director, Institute of Cognitive Science, Carleton University, Pete Mandik, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Coordinator, Cognitive Science Lab, William Paterson University
  • Edited by Andrew Brook, Carleton University, Ottawa, Kathleen Akins, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia
  • Book: Cognition and the Brain
  • Online publication: 02 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610608.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
    • By Andrew Brook, Professor of Philosophy and Director, Institute of Cognitive Science, Carleton University, Pete Mandik, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Coordinator, Cognitive Science Lab, William Paterson University
  • Edited by Andrew Brook, Carleton University, Ottawa, Kathleen Akins, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia
  • Book: Cognition and the Brain
  • Online publication: 02 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610608.001
Available formats
×