7 - Grasping and Perceiving Objects
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2010
Summary
Introduction
There is today, or so I will argue in this chapter, a vast array of empirical evidence in favor of the ‘two visual systems’ model of human vision. Human beings are so visually endowed that they can see a wide variety of things. Some of the things that they can see are objects that they can also reach, grasp and manipulate with their hands. Many of the things that they can see, however, are not objects that they can reach and grasp. As J. Austin (1962) pointed out, humans can see, for example, mountains, lakes, liquids, gases, clouds, flames, movies, shadows, holes, stars, planets, comets and events. Among events, humans can see behaviours or actions, some of which are performed by conspecifics. Some visible human actions are directed towards inanimate objects (e.g., actions of reaching and grasping an object or a tool). Others are directed towards animate objects, including animals and conspecifics. In P. Jacob and M. Jeannerod (2003), we argue that there is evidence for the view that the human brain contains two complementary networks that respond to the perception of respectively object-oriented actions and actions directed towards conspecifics.
In this chapter, I will restrict myself to the visual processing of objects that can be both perceived and grasped with a human hand. My goal will be to try to formulate an adequate version of the two visual systems model of human vision, which ought, I think, to be properly restricted to seeing objects that can be reached and grasped.
- Type
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- Information
- Cognition and the BrainThe Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement, pp. 241 - 283Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005
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