Introduction

Nicholas Rengger’s just war thought defies simple classification. His work clearly stands as a critique of both the legalist and revisionist approaches, which he deems overly optimistic about human nature and human capacities, and thus ultimately overly optimistic about the possibility that human institutions could work effectively to ‘solve’ the problem of war. Nor can Rengger be easily categorized as a just war thinker in the classical vein – while he clearly appreciates theological approaches both past and present, it would be a stretch to say that his work is primarily grounded in theology. Even contemporary neo-classical approaches to just war thinking face Rengger’s critique as rather too state-centric in their approach. In Rengger’s thinking, questions of just war are part and parcel of the broader project of international relations (IR). Rengger’s broader approach to thinking about IR also transcends the usual paradigmatic pigeon-holes. Despite his deep scepticism about the robustness of international order, Rengger nonetheless calls contemporary realism to task for its insufficient interest in the problem of order. Likewise, he finds classical realists to be kindred spirits in many respects, but cautions against accepting their view of politics as tragedy.

Rengger’s fundamental scepticism takes nothing for granted, questioning everything. For some, this might leave the impression that Rengger is perhaps better at asking questions than answering them, better at pointing out the pitfalls in others’ arguments about the ethics of war than at mapping out a way around them. I would argue, however, that this is precisely Rengger’s point. We begin to go astray the moment we think ourselves to be standing on firm ground. Those of us asking questions about what is right and wrong in war are certainly seeking a kind of Truth. We want to know what is Just. Rengger’s relentless scepticism is unsettling because it demands that we accept that none of us will ever quite get to such an understanding. But this isn’t a blank cheque to succumb to nihilism, or to relativism, or even to some sort of tragic acceptance of our imperfectability. Instead, Rengger sees scepticism as opening opportunities for dialogue and deliberative discussions with others in which we leave open the possibility that our own original position may be incorrect and thus in need of modification.