The study of values has been cyclical. It reached its nadir in the early 1970s, fell from prominence following a barrage of criticisms, and now once again is gaining momentum. Most of the criticisms focused on two aspects of the values research. First, scholars disagreed on which values were fundamental, leaving them open to the the argument that if they cannot agree, they probably do not know what values are. Second, and closely related, researchers measured values in a variety of ways, from open-ended questions to simple lists to rank orderings. As a result, exchanges often dwelled on what became narrow questions about measurement.

The recent revival of values is readily explainable: they are so basic to human thought that they simply cannot be ignored. Not everyone holds political attitudes, but presumably everyone has ideas about right and wrong, good and bad, how people should conduct their lives, and the like. One obvious question for political scientists is, to what extent, and how, do people use their values to reach political judgments? Two of the chapters in this part address this question, using data collected for just this purpose. One introduces a value – humanitarianism – that is central to judgments about welfare policy. This value, the authors show, helps to explain why most Americans endorse the welfare state even though they openly criticize the policies that undergird it. The other chapter challenges what is perhaps the most cherished and widespread assumption in American political thought: individualism is a value to which nearly all Americans subscribe.