After a brief introduction to the concept of judicial (dis-)empowerment and its application in an authoritarian context, the chapter compares the main actors in and procedures of corruption investigation pre- and post-reform to pinpoint the exact legal and structural changes brought about by the reform. It discusses how the newly established supervision commissions have changed the roles of the procuratorate and courts in criminal procedures against corruption, as well as their powers vis-à-vis investigators and party and executive organs at the same level. The chapter then examines the institutional embeddedness of the supervision commissions within the broader structure of the party-state’s dual system and central–local relations, before challenging the extant research that comprehends the new anti-corruption mechanism as a successful centralisation measure of the Communist Party of China. Its ultimate argument is that by legally transferring the jurisdiction of criminal investigations of corruption from the procuratorates to the supervision commissions, and consequently to the Commission for Discipline Inspection, the reform has substantially weakened the judiciary’s power vis-à-vis local party committees and other state institutions.