Book contents
- China’s Chance to Lead
- Business and Public Policy
- China’s Chance to Lead
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Market Failures and China’s Chance to Lead
- 3 Measuring Infrastructure Needs and Foreign Infrastructure Investment
- 4 Theory
- 5 Measuring Clientelism and the Corporate Sector across Political Regimes
- 6 Political Regimes and BRI Country-Level Patterns
- 7 Political Regimes and BRI Project Characteristics
- 8 Case Studies of Political Regimes and the BRI
- 9 Chinese Exports of Digital Technologies and Standards
- 10 Conclusions and Implications
- References
- Index
- Business and Public Policy
6 - Political Regimes and BRI Country-Level Patterns
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 November 2023
- China’s Chance to Lead
- Business and Public Policy
- China’s Chance to Lead
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Market Failures and China’s Chance to Lead
- 3 Measuring Infrastructure Needs and Foreign Infrastructure Investment
- 4 Theory
- 5 Measuring Clientelism and the Corporate Sector across Political Regimes
- 6 Political Regimes and BRI Country-Level Patterns
- 7 Political Regimes and BRI Project Characteristics
- 8 Case Studies of Political Regimes and the BRI
- 9 Chinese Exports of Digital Technologies and Standards
- 10 Conclusions and Implications
- References
- Index
- Business and Public Policy
Summary
The key question this chapter addresses is which countries are the most receptive to Chinese foreign infrastructure spending? I theorize electoral autocracies will be the most avid recipients. This chapter analyzes Chinese foreign spending since the introduction of the BRI at the end of 2013 with data from the China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT) dataset. Multivariate tests indicate electoral autocracies are the major recipients during the BRI timeframe, from 2014 to 2019. Extending the timeframe to 2005 to 2019, the findings indicate a substantive difference in the relationship between Chinese foreign construction spending and electoral autocracies that occurs with the initiation of the BRI. Logistics performance indicators also show electoral autocracies display the greatest improvement from before to after the introduction of the BRI. While the share of Chinese exports flowing to electoral autocracies increases during the BRI time period, it is not possible to conclude this is a deviation from previous trends; more time is needed to establish confidence for these effects. The main takeaway is the exceptional role electoral autocracies play in attracting Chinese foreign spending in the context of the BRI, especially when the leaders have an insecure hold on power.
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- Information
- China's Chance to LeadAcquiring Global Influence via Infrastructure Development and Digitalization, pp. 138 - 173Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023