Book contents
- China’s Chance to Lead
- Business and Public Policy
- China’s Chance to Lead
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Market Failures and China’s Chance to Lead
- 3 Measuring Infrastructure Needs and Foreign Infrastructure Investment
- 4 Theory
- 5 Measuring Clientelism and the Corporate Sector across Political Regimes
- 6 Political Regimes and BRI Country-Level Patterns
- 7 Political Regimes and BRI Project Characteristics
- 8 Case Studies of Political Regimes and the BRI
- 9 Chinese Exports of Digital Technologies and Standards
- 10 Conclusions and Implications
- References
- Index
- Business and Public Policy
5 - Measuring Clientelism and the Corporate Sector across Political Regimes
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 November 2023
- China’s Chance to Lead
- Business and Public Policy
- China’s Chance to Lead
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Market Failures and China’s Chance to Lead
- 3 Measuring Infrastructure Needs and Foreign Infrastructure Investment
- 4 Theory
- 5 Measuring Clientelism and the Corporate Sector across Political Regimes
- 6 Political Regimes and BRI Country-Level Patterns
- 7 Political Regimes and BRI Project Characteristics
- 8 Case Studies of Political Regimes and the BRI
- 9 Chinese Exports of Digital Technologies and Standards
- 10 Conclusions and Implications
- References
- Index
- Business and Public Policy
Summary
This chapter establishes the empirical facts regarding political regimes and the prevalence of clientelism and the public-private orientation of the corporate sector. It begins by showing that electoral autocracies constitute around half of all developing countries during the 2010s, the most of any regime type. They are especially prevalent in Africa and Asia. The theory posits that clientelism plays an important role in driving Chinese foreign infrastructure spending. Several widely used proxies for clientelism establish that it is most prevalent in electoral autocracies. The theory also posits state control of the corporate sector is important to attracting Chinese foreign spending. A variety of measures are used to establish that state ownership of the corporate sector is significantly higher in autocracies than in democracies, especially in industries related to infrastructure. Overall, this chapter provides robust evidence about the characteristics of political regimes posited to influence Chinese infrastructure spending.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- China's Chance to LeadAcquiring Global Influence via Infrastructure Development and Digitalization, pp. 108 - 137Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023