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Part II - Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2018

Philipp Hartmann
Affiliation:
European Central Bank, Frankfurt
Haizhou Huang
Affiliation:
China International Capital Corporation
Dirk Schoenmaker
Affiliation:
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
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Print publication year: 2018

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