INTRODUCTION

Having concluded that a social clause for the implementation of the international prohibition of child labour is recommendable, this chapter will outline the basic principles for such a clause in accordance with the findings of this work. A key finding is that any imposition of trade measures should be accompanied by complementary measures such as education and rehabilitation of the former child labourers.

The main rationales for the adoption of such a regime are the effectiveness of trade measures on child labour – if designed in the right way – the call for coherence in international law as illustrated by the case of Myanmar examined in Chapter 3 and the almost universal consensus on the prohibition of child labour in international law.

The WTO being the principal institution for trade at the global level and the ILO being the key institution for placing decent work at the centre of economic policies, such a clause should be based upon the implementation mechanisms of these institutions. In line with its objective to contribute to solving the problem of child labour, the implementation mechanism would primarily aim at inducing compliance with the prohibition of child labour rather than maintaining the balance of reciprocal trade concessions, as is the case of countermeasures under the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO.

Before exploring the basic principles, the central issue of the political debate surrounding such a social clause will be briefly addressed: the fear of protectionism.