Book contents
- Cartels Diagnosed
- Cartels Diagnosed
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Entry Barriers, Personal Relationships, and Cartel Formation
- 2 “Now You Are Asking for a Real War!”
- 3 Coordinating Fuel Surcharges
- 4 Price Fixing or Fixing Competition?
- 5 The Role of Platforms for Facilitating Anticompetitive Communication
- 6 Collusion with Non-express Communication
- 7 Cartel Instability and Price Wars
- 8 Coordinated Rebate Reductions and Semi-collusion
- 9 Average Bid Auction Format Facilitates Bidding Rings
- 10 The Challenges of Cartelization with Many Products and Ongoing Technological Advancements
- 11 Two Cartels in the Supply Chain
- 12 Is it Collusion or Competition behind Price Parallelism?
- References
5 - The Role of Platforms for Facilitating Anticompetitive Communication
Retail Gasoline in Australia*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 December 2024
Book contents
- Cartels Diagnosed
- Cartels Diagnosed
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Entry Barriers, Personal Relationships, and Cartel Formation
- 2 “Now You Are Asking for a Real War!”
- 3 Coordinating Fuel Surcharges
- 4 Price Fixing or Fixing Competition?
- 5 The Role of Platforms for Facilitating Anticompetitive Communication
- 6 Collusion with Non-express Communication
- 7 Cartel Instability and Price Wars
- 8 Coordinated Rebate Reductions and Semi-collusion
- 9 Average Bid Auction Format Facilitates Bidding Rings
- 10 The Challenges of Cartelization with Many Products and Ongoing Technological Advancements
- 11 Two Cartels in the Supply Chain
- 12 Is it Collusion or Competition behind Price Parallelism?
- References
Summary
◦ This case study describes price signaling through a third-party data subscription service.
◦ Informed Sources provided a data subscription service to companies operating in the retail gasoline market in Australia. Each subscribing company provided its prices at a high-frequency (on the order of every fifteen to thirty minutes) to the Informed Sources online platform and was given access to all subscribers’ prices on that platform.
◦ The Informed Sources platform was supportive of collusion as it facilitated coordinating on high prices – by allowing for low-cost signaling of future prices – and monitoring for compliance with those high prices. The platform allowed for tacit and indirect communication, and collusion could occur without explicit and direct communication.
◦ Using data from a similar platform, FuelCheck, empirical evidence is provided that supports this type of platform having anticompetitive effects by reducing the risks and costs associated with price leadership while achieving a common understanding among firms as to the prices to charge.
◦ For policymakers, the case study underscores competitive concerns associated with price-sharing platforms. In particular, the speed and reliability with which communication was possible through the Informed Sources platform substantially removed the usual deterrents to firms’ using prices for signaling.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Cartels DiagnosedNew Insights on Collusion, pp. 131 - 170Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
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