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15. - Attribute

from A

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Noa Shein
Edited by
Karolina Hübner  and
Justin Steinberg
Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

Spinoza defines attributes (attributum) thus: “By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence” (E1def4). We can begin by noting two elements of the definition that make apparent the centrality of attributes to Spinoza’s metaphysics: first, attributes are closely associated with the very essence of substance. Second, attributes are intimately related to the way in which the intellect perceives the essence of substance. In spite of their centrality in Spinoza’s philosophy, there is astonishingly little agreement among scholars as to their nature.

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The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 36 - 40
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Curley, E. M. (1988). Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza’s Ethics. Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Deleuze, G. (1990). Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Zone.Google Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (2012). “Rationalism, idealism, monism, and beyond.” In Förster, E. and Melamed, Y. Y. (eds.), Spinoza and German Idealism (pp. 7–26). Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hübner, K. (2021). “Spinoza on the limits of explanation.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(2), 341–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lennon, T. M. (2005). “The rationalist conception of substance.” In Nelson, Alan (ed.), A Companion to Rationalism (pp. 12–30). Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lin, M. (2006). “Substance, attribute, and mode in Spinoza.” Philosophy Compass, 1(2), 144–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Melamed, Y. (2013). “Spinoza’s metaphysics of thought: Parallelisms and the multifaceted structure of ideas.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86(3), 636–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Newlands, S. (2018). Reconceiving Spinoza. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shein, N. (2009). “The false dichotomy between objective and subjective interpretations of Spinoza’s theory of attributes.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 17(3), 505–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shein, N. (2018). “Spinoza’s theory of attributes.” In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/spinoza-attributesGoogle Scholar

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  • Attribute
  • Edited by Karolina Hübner, Cornell University, New York, Justin Steinberg, Cornell University, New York
  • Book: The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
  • Online publication: 09 January 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108992459.015
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  • Attribute
  • Edited by Karolina Hübner, Cornell University, New York, Justin Steinberg, Cornell University, New York
  • Book: The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
  • Online publication: 09 January 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108992459.015
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Attribute
  • Edited by Karolina Hübner, Cornell University, New York, Justin Steinberg, Cornell University, New York
  • Book: The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
  • Online publication: 09 January 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108992459.015
Available formats
×